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INTRODUCTION
Medical marijuana law and policy is at a crossroads in America. On
the one hand, it appears the field has achieved a level of legitimacy it so
desperately sought, as more than 30 states, territories, and districts have
enacted comprehensive medical marijuana1 programs in the past two
decades. Such programs currently employ thousands of Americans and are
expected to generate thousands of additional jobs across the country in the
coming years,2 while also generating much-needed tax revenue for state
economies ravaged by austerity politics.3 Further, comprehensive medical
marijuana programs create extensive legal protections for program
participants, commonly known as “qualified patients,”4 shielding them from
government sanctions that would normally apply to marijuana users.
In spite of these gains, medical marijuana is often still characterized
as little more than a joke or an excuse to lend drug abusers an unearned air
of legitimacy.5 Proponents of these views point to the supposedly-outsized
1. This Article seeks only to describe the constitutional violations facing medical
marijuana users, though many of the same arguments could be made for users of recreational
marijuana in jurisdictions where it has been made legal as well. See Klieger, et al., infra
notes 32–33 (describing the differences between comprehensive and non-comprehensive
programs). This Article will describe all jurisdictions with medical marijuana programs as
“states” for the sake of simplicity, unless otherwise noted.
2. Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More Jobs Than
Manufacturing by 2020, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2017, 10:51 AM), https://perma.cc/M8ZJ-AY7T
(describing the positive effects that medical and recreational marijuana legalization has had
and predicting large growth in the sector in the coming years).
3. The medical marijuana market was worth roughly $4.7 billion in 2016 and is
estimated to be worth $13.2 billion in 2025. NEW FRONTIER DATA, THE CANNABIS INDUSTRY
ANNUAL REPORT: 2017 LEGAL MARIJUANA OUTLOOK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (2017).
4. Although this specific term is not used by every state, this Article will hereafter
refer to all individuals registered under medical marijuana laws as “qualified patients,”
unless noted otherwise. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2801(13) (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 1st Reg. Sess. of 53d Leg. (2017)); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130 / 10(t) (2016); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-3(G) (2017).
5. See Paula Reid & Stephanie Condon, DEA Chief Says Smoking Marijuana as
Medicine “Is a Joke”, CBS NEWS (Nov. 4, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://perma.cc/W5AU-VJWY.
As will be further discussed, the question of medical marijuana’s scientific legitimacy is still
being debated in some states. Mark Osborne, Mormon Church Comes Out in Opposition to
Utah’s Medical Marijuana Ballot Initiative, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2018, 3:28 AM),
https://perma.cc/933C-962D.
Media outlets frequently use the drug and the culture around marijuana use to craft
headline puns. See, e.g., David W. Clark, Missouri House’s Medical Marijuana Bill is
Nothing but a Smokescreen, KANSAS CITY STAR (May 13, 2018, 8:30 PM)
https://perma.cc/E8C3-87FR; Randy Tucker, Ohio’s Medical Marijuana Program Could Be
Blunted by Judge’s Ruling, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (May 14, 2018, 10:13 AM),
https://perma.cc/E8C3-87FR.
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number of registrants in any given state or deride the medical reasoning used
for registration as illegitimate.6 The other, more pressing issue facing
comprehensive medical marijuana programs and participants is the federal
government’s near-complete ban on marijuana, regardless of form, which
criminalizes possession, cultivation, and distribution as felony offenses
punishable by numerous criminal and civil penalties.7 Further, federal law
utilizes a number of lesser-known, “soft” penalties against individuals found
to have used marijuana, including forbidding marijuana users from obtaining
government-backed student loans, making banking nearly impossible for
dispensaries and cultivation centers,8 and qualifying an individual’s Second
Amendment right to possess firearms.
Standing in stark contrast to medical marijuana, the right to bear
arms, and firearms by virtue of the association, is afforded rarified status as
one of the most cherished and protected rights afforded to Americans.9
Firearms proponents have the backing of the National Rifle Association, one
of, if not the most powerful lobbying organization in America,10 and a
Congress that is loath to tackle gun control under any circumstances, despite
mounting evidence to the contrary.11 If anything, the right appears to be
expanding. Indeed, the landmark Supreme Court case, District of Columbia
v. Heller,12 overturned more than 200 years of Second Amendment precedent
and recognized—for the first time—the personal right for law-abiding
individuals to possess a firearm for any lawful purpose. This Article explores
the rarely-discussed nexus where medical marijuana legalization, federal
marijuana prohibition, and Second Amendment jurisprudence converge.
Part I begins by describing comprehensive medical marijuana laws
and policies as a basis for the discussion to follow, before moving on to look
at marijuana treatment at the federal level. In 1996, California passed the
6. Gerald Caplan, Medical Marijuana: A Study of Unintended Consequences, 43
MCGEORGE L. REV. 127, 129–35 (2012) (collecting examples purporting to be proof of
“implementation . . . problems”); but see PROCON.ORG, infra note 304.
7. See generally KARIN D. JONES & JAMES M. SHORE, MARIJUANA REGULATION
§ 2.04 (2018) (describing taxes on marijuana of up to $100 per ounce and mandatory
minimum sentences of two to ten years accompanied by up to a $20,000 fine).
8. See LISA N. SACCO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44782, THE MARIJUANA
POLICY GAP AND THE PATH FORWARD 16–20 (2017).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
10. See Alan Berlow & Gordon Witkin, Gun Lobby’s Money and Power Still Holds
Sway over Congress, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 1, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/EL6T-JZJK.
11. See Matt Taylor, Why Wasn’t Sandy Hook the Mass Shooting that Changed
Everything?, VICE (Dec. 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/EHQ3-D42J (describing
America’s acceptance of mass shootings as a fact of life and congressional inaction
following the deaths of 20 elementary school children and six adults); see also David
Montero, FBI Chief in Nevada Says Motive Behind Las Vegas Concert Massacre is Still a
Mystery, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://perma.cc/Y3YF-HNLQ (reporting,
more than two months after the deadliest mass shooting in American history, that authorities
are still in the dark regarding the shooter’s motive).
12. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Compassionate Use Act,13 becoming the first state to create a comprehensive
medical marijuana program, making marijuana use, cultivation, distribution,
and possession legal for medicinal purposes. In just over 21 years, the
number of states with similar programs has swelled to more than 30,14 each
of which considers the use of marijuana to be a humanitarian medical act
intended to alleviate the pain and suffering associated with certain
debilitating medical conditions. These states provide expansive legal
protections for qualified patients against criminal and civil sanctions by
government citizens as well, with some providing similar protections against
discrimination by private actors. Notably, in a seeming rebuke to Congress’
rationale under the Gun Control Act, most of these states allow for qualified
patients to possess firearms, providing exceptions to state law where
possession by marijuana users is otherwise forbidden.15
Congress created the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in 1970,
which classified marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic, thus making it illegal
under federal law.16 Since then, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), which is charged with administering
the CSA, have resisted all calls to reschedule marijuana to the less-strict
Schedule II,17 citing a dearth of sufficient scientific research tending to show
marijuana’s efficacy as a medicinal treatment in spite of Schedule I’s
research restrictions.18 Recent years have greatly confused federal marijuana
policy and enforcement, however. Beginning in 2009, President Obama’s
DOJ released a series of three often confusing and seemingly-contradictory
memos describing its shifting but relaxed enforcement policies against both
medical and recreational marijuana programs and participants, though they
have likely been repealed under the new administration.19 Congress also had
its say, successfully outmaneuvering all DOJ enforcement of medical
marijuana programs in 2014 by passing the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment,
an appropriations rider that forbids the DOJ from using any funds made
available by Congress to prevent states from implementing or furthering their
programs.20 Two subsequent Ninth Circuit rulings upheld the application of
Rohrabacher-Farr against the DOJ and its subsidiary agencies.21

13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017) (Adopted by voters, Cal.
Prop. 215 § 1, effective November 6, 1996).
14. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
15. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
16. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971
(2016)); see also § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2016).
17. See sources cited infra notes 104–09.
18. But see infra note 45.
19. See memoranda cited infra notes 135–37, 161.
20. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014).
21. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Marin All., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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Part II gives a brief overview of Second Amendment and Gun
Control Act jurisprudence, which has changed and expanded drastically since
2008. Similar to the CSA, the Gun Control Act contains numerous provisions
qualifying the Second Amendment rights of individuals for illegal or
seemingly-dangerous conduct, which this Article terms “individual category
qualifications.” This Article will predominately focus on section 922(g)(3)
of the Gun Control Act, which denies illegal drug users the right to possess
firearms22 under the auspices that such individuals are “presumptively risky
people” and more dangerous to the general public.23 Thus, in the eyes of the
federal government, if a qualifying patient uses marijuana, she forfeits her
right to possess a firearm under the Second Amendment for so long as she is
considered a user.
Separately, though still critically linked, the Supreme Court’s
aforementioned decision in Heller left federal courts with no manageable
standard for assessing the constitutionality of federal firearms regulations
found in the Gun Control Act. In order to fill this vacuum, the federal circuit
courts created a two-part test, largely cribbed from the text of Heller,
intended to determine (1) whether the rule or regulation in question burdens
an individual’s Second Amendment rights, and if so, (2) whether the burden
in question passes muster under the appropriate level of scrutiny.24 Since its
adoption, the test has been used successfully only once, in Tyler v. Hillsdale
County Sheriff’s Department.25 There, the Sixth Circuit described the
appropriate application of the post-Heller two-step test, including the need to
consider the length of the qualification’s temporal limitation against the
individual, but more importantly, whether the individual is considered more
violent than the general public and the manner by which federal courts should
review and use longitudinal scientific evidence26 to answer that question.
Part III attempts to bring together each of these loose ends, beginning
with an examination of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson v. Lynch.27
While the case differs slightly from what a “conventional” qualified patient
22. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2017)).
23. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing S. Rep. No.
90-1501, at 22 (1968)).
24. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
25. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
26. Id. at 697–98. Longitudinal scientific evidence is produced by studies which
“employ continuous or repeated measures to follow particular individuals over prolonged
periods of time—often years or decades.” Edward Joseph Caruana et al., Longitudinal
Studies, 7 J. THORACIC DISEASE E537, E537 (2015). Such studies are typically observational
in nature, comprised of highly-controlled environments accounting for the numerous
variables encountered in each study, and control groups with minimal outside influence
being applied and as much data being collected as possible. Though such studies do present
some drawbacks, the positives outweigh the negatives, especially for macro-level statistical
analysis. Id. at E537–38.
27. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016).
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can expect in the future, it is still instructive as it is the first federal circuit
court decision to apply the Gun Control Act to qualified patients. This Article
argues that the Ninth Circuit made three critical errors in reaching an
inappropriate and unconstitutional conclusion under the two-step test. First,
it held that qualified patients suffer only a limited temporal limitation under
the qualification imposed by the Gun Control Act because they may give up
their state marijuana registration and thereafter become eligible to again
possess a firearm.28 Second, the court found that marijuana users, including
qualified patients, are more violent than the general population solely on the
basis of conclusions arrived at by another federal circuit court, which were
based both upon non-longitudinal government surveys and gross misreadings
of the conclusions and analyses of the studies reviewed.29 Third, the Ninth
Circuit found that even if it was visiting constitutional violations upon
qualified patients, precedent allows for such overreaches against a minority
of individuals.30 In addition to these incorrect conclusions, such arguments
should have been ruled moot as this Article further argues that the
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment blocks the DOJ and any of its subsidiary
agencies from enforcing the CSA or Gun Control Act against qualified
patients as such actions impede the implementation of medical marijuana
programs.
I. MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS
This Part explores the confusing, contradictory, and competing laws
governing medical marijuana across the United States. Section A looks to
state medical marijuana regimes where laws are rapidly expanding,
progressive, and protective of qualified patients. That Section also discusses
the differences between legalization and decriminalization, a key distinction
for qualified patients. Section B, conversely, brings the federal sector into
focus and finds that the United States government maintains a near-total ban
on marijuana in any form and stridently opposes rescheduling the drug or
making exceptions for medical use. Section B further details the
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, a congressional appropriations rider, which
was enacted in December 2014, and has caused no small amount of confusion
and widespread change at the federal level.31
To determine which laws govern medical marijuana, it is first helpful
to define exactly what is meant by the term itself. Both within the context of
this Article and in broader discussion in American policy, medical marijuana
legalization typically refers to “comprehensive” medical marijuana programs
that meet the four following criteria: (1) Provide legal protections from
28. Id. at 1093.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1098.
31. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014).
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criminal and civil charges for individuals operating within state laws; (2)
Provide access to marijuana either through private cultivation, dispensaries
open to the public, or some other easily accessible outlet; (3) Allow for the
cultivation and public distribution of a variety of strains of all strengths, not
solely low-tetrahydrocannabinol (hereinafter, “THC”), high-cannabidiol
(hereinafter “CBD”) products; and (4) Allow for the consumption of
marijuana products in a variety of ways, including smoking, vaporization, or
eating.32 Low-THC, high-CBD products have been legalized in 16 additional
states, but each state’s legalization program fails to include one or more of
the four criteria above.33 Federal law, conversely, makes no distinction
between high- or low-THC marijuana and considers all such products to be
Schedule I narcotics under the CSA.34
A. Comprehensive Medical Marijuana Programs
In 1996, when California successfully implemented the country’s
first state-run medical marijuana initiative, the prospects for widespread
medical marijuana legalization—even at the state level—seemed grim, as
Arizona voters had also approved a medical marijuana initiative, but it was
scuttled before becoming law due to incorrect wording.35 At the time, every
state had criminalized the possession, cultivation, distribution, and use of

32. See Sarah B. Klieger et al., Mapping Medical Marijuana: State Laws Regulating
Patients, Product Safety, Supply Chains and Dispensaries, 2017, 112 ADDICTION 2206, 2207
(2017); State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last
updated June 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/N7E6-H6K7. This Article will focus almost
exclusively on states with comprehensive medical marijuana regimes, though noncomprehensive programs are considered by both federal law and the Rohrabacher-Farr
Amendment.
Washington, D.C.’s medical marijuana program is, perhaps understandably, something
of an outlier in that it does not protect qualified patients from either civil sanctions by
government actors or the denial of any rights or privileges afforded to citizens otherwise, yet
it is still considered comprehensive. See D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08(c), (d) (2018).
33. See Klieger et al., supra note 32, at 2207–08; 17 States with Laws Specifically
About Legal Cannabidiol (CBD), PROCON.ORG (May 8, 2018, 11:13 AM),
https://perma.cc/4BGN-PBNU; but see MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE
MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST, 2015, at A-11 (2015
& Supp. 2016) (stating that Missouri may have a “workable” low-THC law).
34. John Hudak & Christine Stenglein, DEA Guidance is Clear: Cannabidiol is Illegal
and Always Has Been, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4HMN-XGDJ.
35. Prior to successfully legalizing marijuana in 2010, Arizonans twice voted in favor
of medical marijuana initiatives only to see both ballot initiatives overturned prior to
implementation as each contained fatally-flawed language. The aforementioned 1996
proposal failed when “federal authorities threatened to revoke the licenses of doctors who
prescribed marijuana” while the 1998 version required the federal government to legalize the
use of medical marijuana prior to state legalization. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Prop. 203:
Legalization of Medical Marijuana, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 26, 2010, 1:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/HM5E-VWPR.
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marijuana since the 1930s,36 nationwide efforts toward legalization by other
states were still years away, and public approval for legalization was sitting
at 25% in August 1995.37 Nevertheless, California voters approved the
measure and laid the groundwork for the future.
Since California made the first move, 29 other states, in addition to
Washington, D.C., Guam, and Puerto Rico38 have followed suit and created
their own comprehensive medical marijuana programs, legalizing use,
possession, cultivation, and distribution to varying degrees—bringing the
total number to 33 states. Though all comprehensive medical marijuana
programs differ to some degree, they share similar legislative framework and
characteristics across a broad spectrum. Like California’s Compassionate
Use Act,39 each state identifies a number of similar factors, including the
following: who may participate, what medical conditions qualify
participants, outlining the role of physicians in the program, and
establishment of legal protections for qualified patients and distributors.
Within the context of these state laws, it is appropriate for this Article
to address a question that is at once both critical to the information presented
and oft-maligned as a joke: Is marijuana considered an accepted form of
medicine?40 In 1999, following a request from the Clinton White House, the
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) compiled and published an extensive report
that “summarizes and analyzes what is known about the medical use of
marijuana,” emphasizing the “evidence-based medicine . . . as opposed to
belief-based medicine.”41 While the report notes that marijuana is considered
controversial in many respects, the IOM was unequivocal in its assessment
of marijuana’s efficacy as a therapeutic form of medicine, stating that,
[c]ontroversies concerning nonmedical use of marijuana
spill over onto the medical marijuana debate and tend to
obscure the real state of scientific knowledge. In contrast
with the many disagreements bearing on the social issues,
36. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1427 n.14 (2009).
37. GALLUP, Do You Think the Use of Marijuana Should be Made Legal, or Not?, in
ILLEGAL DRUGS, https://perma.cc/9682-TCJK.
38. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017).
40. Though some may scoff at the question, given the growing social and political
acceptance of medical marijuana, it is notable that as of 2016, the U.S. government still did
not consider marijuana to have proven medicinal value. Denial of Petition to Initiate
Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688, 53,700 (Aug. 12, 2016); see
also Jennifer De Pinto et al., Marijuana Legalization Support at All-Time High, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/RZ54-YR9C (reporting that polls show that 88%
of Americans believe marijuana should be legalized for medicinal purposes).
41. INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA & MED.: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 1–2 (1999)
(defining evidence-based medicine as “derived from knowledge and experience informed by
rigorous scientific analysis” and belief-based medicine as “derived from judgment, intuition,
and beliefs untested by rigorous science”).
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the study team found substantial consensus, among experts
in the relevant disciplines, on the scientific evidence bearing
on potential medical use.42
The IOM arrived at this consensus after finding more than 30
separate, individualized, medical uses for marijuana in addition to treatment
of generalized symptoms like “pain, nausea and vomiting, and muscle
spasms.”43 In short, the IOM found that a consensus of available data and
reporting showed that marijuana is not only widely considered to be a form
of medicine that provides therapeutic relief for a wide range of conditions,
but that its side effects, such as the psychoactive “high,” are “within
acceptable risks associated with approved medications,” and such side effects
are even useful to individuals treating certain conditions such as anxiety. 44
Marijuana as a form of therapeutic medicine is no longer a controversial
question within the scientific and medical communities as evidenced by a
follow-up report released in 2017 by the IOM’s parent organization, the
National Academy of Sciences.45 The 2017 study arrived at nearly 100
conclusions based on new studies and data finding conclusive evidence exists
showing that marijuana is effective as a therapeutic form of medicine.46
Following this lead, states that have adopted comprehensive medical
marijuana programs have endorsed the scientific consensus on the matter.
Some states, such as Washington, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, are quite
explicit in this regard, having codified references to medical marijuana as a
humanitarian act meant to improve quality of life and forthrightly state that
one of the bases for their laws is to accrue medical benefits to qualified
patients.47 Those states without a specific declaration to that effect have
tacitly embraced the idea by the very wording of the laws and their
requirements, such as mandating some proof of a qualifying condition.48

42. Id. at 13–14 (emphasis added); see also id. at 34–35.
43. Id. at 138. The study was conducted utilizing a series of comprehensive workshops
comprised of experts discussing the issue and a panel of nine experts on the subject reviewed
the literature and studies presented, which heard comment from a “roughly equal number[]
of persons and organizations opposed to and in favor of the medical use of marijuana.” Id. at
15–16.
44. Id. at 125–27, 137–38. The study additionally concluded that while some
individuals who experience “contraindicated” effects from the use of marijuana, this is not
uncommon to “many medications.” Id. at 127.
45. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND
CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH
1–6 (2017).
46. Id. at 7–22.
47. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.102(1) (West Supp. 2018); 21 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-2(1) (Supp. 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6).
48. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C § Appx. (West, Westlaw through
Chapter 108 of 2018 2d Ann. Sess.) (entitled “Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana”).
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While all medical marijuana regimes differ to some degree, as the
remainder of this Part will no doubt illustrate, they each share a few common
elements. One such example requires that all qualified patients suffer from a
“debilitating”49 or “serious” medical condition,50 usually termed a
“qualifying condition.” A prospective registrant51 thus becomes a qualified
patient in the eyes of her state provided she suffers from a qualifying
condition and can show proof of that malady.52 Typically, the patient is
diagnosed with the qualifying condition by a physician or specialist and later
sees a separate licensed physician who may recommend medical marijuana
after reviewing copies of the patient’s diagnosis.53 In order to qualify under
state laws, the attending physician must determine that the patient’s
qualifying condition “may be alleviated”54 by the use of marijuana or the
patient may “benefit” from its use in order to make a recommendation.55
The use of “recommendation” as opposed to “prescription,” both
here and in legislation, is purposeful. It is a carefully-used term of legal art,
employed to keep medical marijuana programs free from at least one form of
federal encroachment.56 Indeed, it is likely that this act of foresight in the
Compassionate Use Act57 is what kept California’s medical marijuana regime
operating initially, and thereafter allowed the trend to continue.58 At the time
California’s medical marijuana regime was created, the federal government
was keen to end it, but did not seek to do so via lawsuit against the state
directly.
Instead, the federal government announced a new policy: the DEA
would revoke the registration of any physician who recommended medical
marijuana, effectively ending their ability to write prescriptions or otherwise
49. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(a).
50. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7(a), (h) (Deering 2017).
51. Minors are usually allowed to become qualified patients, though the requirements
are typically much stricter than those for adults. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(6)
(requiring individuals under the age of 18 to obtain multiple physician diagnoses and a
parent to serve as primary caregiver); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329-122(b) (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through Act 51 of 2018 Sess.) (requiring parental consent and monitoring).
52. Each state’s list of qualifying conditions varies, but usually includes cancer, AIDS
and HIV, glaucoma, Cachexia, multiple sclerosis, and other conditions or disorders that
cause severe or chronic pain, nausea, seizures, and /or muscle spasms. Klieger et al., supra
note 32, at 2211–12 tbl.3.
53. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(a), (j); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11362.7(h), (i) (Deering 2017).
54. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(a)(II).
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005(1)(a) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c
6). Other states, such as Hawaii, have stricter requirements for recommendations and require
that the benefits outweigh the risks to the patient. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329-122(a)(2)
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through Act 51 of 2018 Sess.).
56. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017).
58. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 639; see also Mikos, supra note 36, at 1465–69. Incorrect
terminology of this type doomed Arizona’s initial efforts to pass medical marijuana laws.
See Lee, supra note 35.
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dispense medication and thus killing the market for medical marijuana in
California.59 This strategy insured many physicians would stop
recommending marijuana, but it also ran afoul of the United States
Constitution. The Ninth Circuit stated as much when it found the
government’s policy to be an unconstitutional violation of the doctors’ First
Amendment rights.60 The government argued that to recommend medical
marijuana is to encourage criminal behavior.61 The court, however, was
unmoved, believing that the violations of free speech were too great and the
“potential harms were too attenuated from the proscribed speech.”62 The
government unsuccessfully appealed and eventually accepted the outcome. 63
Following a physician’s recommendation, all states require the
patient to register with the state and obtain an identification card before she
can purchase, possess, or use marijuana legally.64 Due to the amount of
patient information being shared between doctors and agencies, many states
have also created laws which make it unlawful to either access or disseminate
qualifying patient information.65 A small number of states eschew mandatory
registration schemes and have adopted programs that allow for compliance
via different methods. California, for example, only began a voluntary
registration program in 2003.66 The State of Washington created its
registration program in 2016, though it is voluntary and state law explicitly
allows non-registered medical marijuana users to raise their medical
condition as an affirmative defense to marijuana-related charges by law
enforcement if they have not registered with the State.67 Once registered, the

59. Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition
215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997); Conant, 309 F.3d at 639–40 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (arguing that revoking a doctor’s ability to write a prescription is akin to
destroying her ability to practice medicine in America).
60. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (finding the policy unconstitutional as it sought “to
punish physicians on the basis of the content of doctor-patient communications,” that only
the “discussions of the medical use of marijuana trigger the policy,” and “the policy does not
merely prohibit the discussion of marijuana; it condemns expression of a particular
viewpoint”).
61. Id. at 638.
62. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., Inc., 535 U.S. 234, 251–52 (2002)).
63. Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946, 946 (2003) (denying certiorari); Conant v.
McCaffrey, No. 00-17222, 2003 U.S. App LEXIS 3932, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2003)
(denying en banc rehearing).
64. See ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(3)(b). The State
of Washington did not require registration as part of its medical marijuana program from
initiation in 1998 until 2016. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.010(19)(a)(vi)(B)
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6).
65. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(3)(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.713
(Deering 2017).
66. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.71 (Deering 2017).
67. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.043 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6).
Maine had a similar statute repealed in 2009. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2427 (Supp.
2016).
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individual becomes a qualifying patient, subject to all the protections
afforded by her state’s laws.68
The final piece of legislative framework discussed by this Article is
the scope of the legal protections afforded to qualified patients. While
decriminalization became a popular method to alleviate some minor criminal
consequences and decrease unnecessary arrests,69 comprehensive medical
marijuana programs go much farther. They legalize possession, purchase,
consumption, cultivation, and distribution within statutory confines, usually
placing these actions under the term “use.”70
Comprehensive legalization removes criminal and civil penalties
associated with state prosecution for the use of marijuana. Such protections
are important to qualified patients and states alike, as more than 99% of all
marijuana arrests are affected by state, not federal, law enforcement
officers.71 When a state creates a medical marijuana program and legalizes
marijuana, it no longer stands in line with either the CSA or the federal
government and is instead in conflict.72 Qualified patients are, in the eyes of
their local law enforcement,73 law-abiding individuals seeking a form of
medical attention.74 States enshrine legal protections into their medical
marijuana statutes, providing explicit protection to qualified patients from
criminal and civil consequences—including civil forfeiture75—enforced by
state actors, either via providing the qualified patient with an affirmative

68. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.010(c) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2017 legislation.);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.712 (Deering 2017).
69. See LISA N. SACCO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44782, THE MARIJUANA
POLICY GAP AND THE PATH FORWARD 7–9 (2017).
70. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(1)(b) (defining “medical use” as “acquisition,
possession, production, use, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia related to the
administration of such marijuana”); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.050(2)
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6).
71. See Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for
Compromise?, 91 OR. L. REV. 1029, 1036–37 (2013) (stating that marijuana cases disposed
of in federal court made only 0.8% of all marijuana arrests in the United States in 2010); see
also Beek v. City of Wyo., 846 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Mich. 2014) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 333.26422 (LexisNexis 2017)) (finding that data provided by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation bears out these statistics).
72. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–844 (2016) (creating harsh criminal penalties for possession and
distribution of Schedule I substances, including marijuana).
73. This should not be read to imply that law enforcement agencies in states with
comprehensive medical marijuana programs—or both medical and recreational
legalization—are more concerned with the civil rights of their citizens. For example,
Colorado, which legalized medical and recreational marijuana in 2000 and 2013,
respectively, now arrests more minority youths for marijuana-based offenses than it did prior
to 2013. Ben Markus, As Adults Legally Smoke Pot in Colorado, More Minority Kids
Arrested for It, NPR (June 29, 2016, 4:50 AM), https://perma.cc/7GT9-JZK4.
74. See sources cited supra notes 41–48.
75. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(e); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(G)
(2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.050(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6).
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defense to charges stemming from marijuana use under the statute76 or by
exempting such individuals from sanctions altogether.77 Increasingly,
however, some states have become aware that these legal protections, while
necessary, do not adequately protect qualified patients from the full spectrum
of consequences they may suffer and are now adding language to protect
them from private discrimination and violations of civil rights, where
possible.78
Seeing the need for expanded protections outside the realm of
criminal and civil sanctions by state actors, states have begun to craft their
medical marijuana laws with language intended to expand civil rights and
anti-discrimination protections for qualified patients. The activities and
rights that are protected vary from state-to-state, but some examples include
protections against discrimination on the basis of an individual’s status as a
qualified patient in employment decisions,79 custody hearings or family law
matters,80 leasing and housing decisions,81 medical care including organ

76. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.310
(LexisNexis 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.913 (2017); but see D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08(d)
(2018) (allowing “[c]ivil fines, penalties, and fees” to be imposed in addition to criminal
penalties for individuals operating outside of or fraudulently representing their participation
in the medical marijuana program).
77. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.2103 (West Supp. 2018); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 4474b(a) (2017).
78. Qualified patients cannot sue in federal court for violations under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) as the act specifically excludes individuals who use
illegal drugs from coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (2016). See also James v. City of Costa
Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 397 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “that the ADA does not protect
medical marijuana users who claim to face discrimination on the basis of their marijuana
use”).
Though federal ADA application appears settled, debate regarding state-level
application abounds when a state has legalized medical marijuana and certain other
conditions exist. Conflict arises when the medical marijuana law also requires nondiscrimination against qualified patients, but the state maintains anti-discrimination statutes
akin to the ADA and state law requires interpretation consistent with federal antidiscrimination law. See Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 303 P.3d 147, 149–52 (Colo. App.
2013) (finding that use of marijuana legally under Colorado’s medical marijuana law still
violated the CSA, which consequently also violated Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute
originally based upon the ADA); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor &
Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 533 (Or. 2010) (holding that Oregon’s ADA-equivalent must be
interpreted consistently with federal law and any state law that would define it otherwise is
preempted); but see cases cited infra notes 84, 87.
79. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 3(f)(3); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 10231.2103(b) (West Supp. 2018); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4(d) (Supp. 2017).
80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(D) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 1st Reg.
Sess. of 53d Leg. (2017)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126:X2(VI) (Supp. 2014); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 3369(3) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 Chapters 1–72).
81. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(A) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of
53d Leg. (2017)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A(a)(1), (c) (2017).

128

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:1: 115

transplants,82 and education.83 Though few states have gone so far as
providing employment protection to qualified patients,84 nearly all states that
enact comprehensive medical marijuana programs contain language similar
to that of New Mexico, which states, “[a] qualified patient shall not be subject
to arrest, prosecution or penalty in any manner for the possession of or the
medical use of cannabis”85(emphasis added). Broadly-worded statutory
protections of this ilk would logically mean that—absent language or
precedent to the contrary86—qualified patients are legally able to possess
firearms in those states.87 Personal property protections are also
commonplace, as police are to confiscate private property in raids or busts.88
82. State laws consider marijuana to be similar to other medication prescribed by a
physician and not an illicit narcotic for these purposes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16
§ 4905A(a)(2) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126:X2(VII) (Supp. 2014); 21 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 21-28.6-4(r) (Supp. 2017).
83. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(A) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 1st Reg.
Sess. of 53d Leg. (2017)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A(c) (2017); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 21-28.6-4(d) (Supp. 2017).
84. Both California’s and Oregon’s state supreme courts have ruled that their medical
marijuana programs do not protect employees who are qualified patients from being fired for
marijuana use under preemption principles as applied to the ADA. See Ross v. RagingWire
Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 208–09 (Cal. 2008); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at
524–25. These decisions have been openly questioned, however. The Michigan Supreme
Court stated it had “misgivings, mildly put” regarding the logic used in Emerald Steel, where
the Oregon Supreme Court misstated and misapplied Supreme Court of the United States
precedent regarding preemption and the CSA; though the Michigan court expressed approval
of the analysis in Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2011), a decision issued subsequent
to Emerald Steel by the Oregon Supreme Court, which appeared to walk back much of the
earlier holding’s language. Beek v. City of Wyo., 846 N.W.2d 531, 540 n.6 (Mich. 2014)
(citation omitted); see also Vikram David Amar, The California Supreme Court’s Decision
on Whether an Employee Can be Fired for Testing Positive for Off-the-Job, DoctorSuggested Medical Use of Marijuana, FINDLAW (Feb. 1, 2008), https://perma.cc/VWU4UF4K.
85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(A) (Supp. 2017); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 69.51A.040 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 c 6). (“may not be arrested, prosecuted, or
subject to other criminal sanctions or civil consequences”).
86. It is plausible that a state could interpret its firearm laws to require that they be
interpreted consistently with federal Second Amendment jurisprudence, which currently
qualifies the right to bear arms by qualified patients, and therefore a qualified patient would
be banned from possessing a firearm at the state level as well. See cases cited supra note 78.
87. See Willis, 253 P.3d at 1061–68 (holding that an Oregon qualified patient may
possess firearm according to Oregon law, that Oregon sheriffs are required to issue
concealed handgun license to qualified applicants who are also qualified patients, and that
the Supremacy Clause does not require states to enforce federal firearms statutes); People v.
Leal, 210 Cal. App. 4th 829, 842 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that defendant had the
right to use medical marijuana and possess firearm simultaneously while on probation prior
to stripping him of these rights for using them to mask illegal activities); Corey Hutchins,
Can You Own a Gun in Colorado if You Smoke Pot?, COLO. INDEP. (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://perma.cc/PSZ6-FSNF (quoting former director of state police chief’s association
stating that there is no issue open-carrying a handgun while also legally using marijuana
under Colorado law); see also infra Appendix, Table 2.
88. See DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE
ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 5 (2d ed. 2015); see also Christopher Ingraham, Law
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Specifically, states provide that any marijuana or drug paraphernalia
unlawfully seized by law enforcement agents must be returned to the owner,
though such protections have been called into question due to possible
violations of the Constitution and federal law.89
B. Federal Laws & Policies
In stark contrast to the constantly-expanding, progressive treatment
of marijuana at the state level, the United States government operates a rigid
system that essentially bans marijuana in any respect. Federal policy is based,
not on currently-available scientific or medical understanding, but on a
prohibitionist90 approach that rejects findings and conclusions about the
efficacy and use of marijuana, even its own.91 To accomplish the goal of
stamping out marijuana usage in America, the federal government uses two
primary mechanisms: the CSA, which provides the legal mechanisms for
prohibition, and the DOJ and its subsidiary agencies, which provide
enforcement and prosecution of the CSA and any collateral laws.
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, more commonly known as the Controlled
Substances Act.92 The CSA gathered numerous federal programs under one
umbrella and became an all-encompassing control mechanism that, among
Enforcement Took More Stuff from People Than Burglars Did Last Year, WASH. POST (Nov.
23, 2015), https://perma.cc/MR43-WCWG.
89. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(G) (Supp. 2017) and Mikos, supra note 36,
at 1459–60 (arguing that returning illegally-seized marijuana and paraphernalia “merely
restores the state of nature” and should not be subject to the doctrine of preemption, though
he does admit that there are as yet “no satisfactory answers”) with People v. Crouse, 388
P.3d 39, 42–43 (Colo. 2017) (en banc) (holding that section 14(2)(e) of Colorado’s medical
marijuana code is unconstitutional as enacted as it requires state officials to return a
federally-controlled substance in violation of the CSA, even where state law deems the
substance to be legal); see also Crouse, 388 P.3d at 45–46 (Gabriel, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a literal reading of the majority’s holding means that any officer distributing narcotics in
a sting operation would be actively and knowingly violating the CSA and therefore subject
to punishment).
90. Prohibition of all illegal narcotics has been America’s publicly-stated drug policy
goal since the early 1970’s. Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and
Counting: The Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, no.
811, Apr. 12, 2017, at 2–4; see also Medical Marijuana Referenda Movement in America:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y,
submitted for the Record).
91. Congress has made numerous inquiries on the subject, even as early as the Senate
hearings debating the CSA, where some members called for a study to examine the effects of
marijuana and possible rescheduling. See S. REP. NO. 91-613, at 1–2, 10 (1969). The study
was performed in the early 1970’s and concluded that marijuana should be legalized for
personal, recreational use, but was never implemented. NAT’L COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA
& DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 466–67 (2d Rep. 1973).
92. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2016)).
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many others, regulates narcotics scheduling, penalties and sentencing,
approved scientific and medical research, and the war on drugs.93 Congress
created the CSA as the centerpiece to all federal actions for marijuana
enforcement.94 In July 1973, nine precursor agencies were combined to form
the DEA,95 which was placed under the DOJ96 and subsequently tasked with
administration and enforcement of the whole of the CSA.97
The CSA regulates the scheduling of all narcotics—legal or illegal.98
Since its creation, the CSA has classified marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic,
meaning that it has “high potential for abuse,” has “no currently accepted
medical use in treatment,” and exhibits a “lack of accepted safety for use . . .
under medical supervision.”99 Physicians may not legally dispense or
prescribe Schedule I substances, but may do so for those on schedules IIV.100 Other substances listed on Schedule I include heroin, LSD, and
peyote,101 while Schedule II—considered safer and acceptable for medical
treatment in the United States—includes opium, cocaine, and
methamphetamines.102
The authority to reschedule marijuana lies with the DEA,103 though
Congress may reschedule a drug via legislation in the absence of action by
the DEA or Attorney General.104 Since the CSA was enacted, marijuana
legalization proponents have been making continuous requests and filing
lawsuits attempting to force the federal government to reschedule marijuana,
though these have so far been unsuccessful.105 The DEA has responded
93. Id.
94. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., HISTORY OF THE DEA: 1970-1975, at 31,
https://perma.cc/HG4P-T527.
95. Exec. Order 11,727, Drug Law Enforcement, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,357 (July 10, 1973).
96. The DEA Administrator reports directly to the Attorney General. Drug
Enforcement Policy Coordination, 28 C.F.R. § 0.102 (2017).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 823 (2016). The Attorney General has formally delegated the
authority granted to that position by the CSA to the DEA Administrator. Drug Enforcement
Administration: General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (2017).
98. The CSA divides hundreds of drugs, plants, chemicals, and even structural
compounds into one of five schedules, with tighter regulations on each schedule descending
from five-to-one, with Schedule I being the most tightly regulated. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2016).
99. Id. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C).
100. Id. § 823(f).
101. Id. § 812(c), Sch. I(b)(10), (c)(9), (12).
102. Id. § 812(c), Sch. II(a)(1), (4), (c).
103. Id. § 811(a); see also All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1133
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
104. Recent years have seen U.S. senators introduce bills which would reschedule
marijuana, though neither has passed, or is likely to, given the current makeup of the Senate.
See Marijuana Justice Act of 2017, S. 1689, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017) (introduced by Sen.
Cory Booker (D-NJ)); Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2015, S. 2237, 114th
Cong. § 3 (2015) (introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT)).
105. See Caroline Herman, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative:
Whatever Happened to Federalism?, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 124–25, n.27
(2002) (compiling cases dating back to 1974 and noting numerous unsuccessful efforts to
lobby Congress).
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unfavorably to requests to reschedule marijuana, describing the evidence
presented by proponents as inconclusive, anecdotal, or biased.106 One such
response is particularly telling. Following a two-year congressional hearing
on marijuana rescheduling held during the 1980s, the presiding
administrative law judge agreed with the “testimony of a number of
physicians and patients” that “marijuana has a currently accepted medical
use” and recommended that it be rescheduled to Schedule II. 107 The DEA
Administrator, however, rejected the recommendation and, after a lengthy
court battle, settled on a new five-part test that is still used to determine
whether marijuana is “currently accepted for medical use.”108 Although this
went against the presiding judge’s recommendation, the D.C. Circuit found
it to be an acceptable action within the DEA Administrator’s prerogative and
discretion.109
Rescheduling marijuana is further hindered by strict federal
guidelines affecting medical and scientific research, including restrictions on
who may participate, supply available to researchers, and quality of that
supply. The federal government greatly restricts research using marijuana
and requires researchers, or “practitioners,” to register with the DEA in order
to “dispense, or conduct research with respect to, controlled substances.”110
Registration to perform research using marijuana or any Schedule I substance
is separate from the registration a practitioner might have for substances
under Schedules II-V.111 Practitioners must also adhere to strict quota
limitations, determined not by practitioners, research guidelines, or scientific
consensus, but by the discretion of the Attorney General.112 Even
participation is made more difficult as all applications are sent to the
Department of Health and Human Services to review the “competency” of
all applicants and the “merits” of each research protocol.113
106. See, e.g., Marijuana Scheduling Petition: Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767,
53,767-68 (Dec. 29, 1989); Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule
Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552, 40,552 (July 8, 2011); Denial of Petition to Initiate
Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688, 53,688 (Aug. 12, 2016).
107. Marijuana Scheduling Petition: Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 53,772
(Dec. 29, 1989); see also All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 938, 940–41
(D.C. Cir. 1991). The DEA Administrator, however, rejected this recommendation and
instead substituted an eight-factor test to determine “currently accepted medical use” for
marijuana. Id. at 938. The D.C. Circuit found that two of the factors were impossible or
unreasonable as imposed and questioned a third that was eventually removed as well and
remanded the case. Id. at 940–41.
108. All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see
also Marijuana Rescheduling Petition: Denial of Petition, Remand, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499,
10,499 (Mar. 26, 1992).
109. All. for Cannabis Therapeutics, 15 F.3d at 1135.
110. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2016).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 826. The Attorney General may arbitrarily decrease quota amounts for
individuals. Id. § 826(b).
113. Id. § 823(f); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.32(a) (2018). These procedures are not required for
research of substances listed on Schedules II-V.
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Supply is also strictly controlled, with all marijuana produced for
research purposes in the United States cultivated at a federal facility at the
University of Mississippi.114 In 2016, the DEA stated that it would work to
expand access to supply, though it is too early to tell whether that has
occurred.115 Additionally, the supply from the University of Mississippi
facility is of lower potency than the product typically available from a
dispensary in a state with a comprehensive medical marijuana program, and
the facility does not produce certain types of products widely available to the
public, such as edibles and concentrates, among others.116 Once researchers
have obtained supply, it must be safeguarded under lock-and-key or other
increased security measures by both practitioners and applicants throughout
the trial.117 Though research currently shows that marijuana has therapeutic
effects for numerous debilitating or life-threatening conditions,118 the extent
of such effects is not fully known in most cases, and CSA-mandated research
barriers “markedly affect the ability to conduct comprehensive basic,
clinical, and public health research.”119 Research restrictions imposed by the
CSA also impede simple tests for purity, contaminants, and chemical
composition.120 This causes additional concerns, because while most states
require some level of product safety testing, these measures are not required
to meet federal standards and vary greatly between each state.121
Aside from criminal sanctions, probably the most well-known aspect
of the CSA is America’s five-decade-old policy known colloquially as the
“war on drugs.” The federal government has long viewed drug use as a
systemic, societal problem that will “steal . . . children’s lives”122 which has

114. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 382–83. The authors note
the difficulty of any single cultivation center or facility to provide the “array and potency of
products available in dispensaries across the country.” Id. at 383.
115. Applications to Become Registered Under the Controlled Substances Act to
Manufacture Marijuana to Supple Researchers in the United States, 81 Fed. Reg. 53846
(2016); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 384.
116. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 382–83.
117. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71 (2018).
118. See sources cited supra notes 41–48.
119. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 390; see id. at 378–90,
400–01 (citing federal CSA research policies as the main impediment to research). The
National Academies note that they were “specifically directed” in their statement of task to
avoid calling for rescheduling of marijuana, though that is the general consensus from all
conclusions. Id. at 382 n.15.
120. Id. at 380, box 15-1.
121. State-mandated testing only tests the product itself and does not test the interaction
of medical marijuana with other medicines or how it interacts with certain patients. Klieger
et al., supra note 32, at 2209 tbl.1.
122. Aviva Shen, The Disastrous Legacy of Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’ Campaign,
THINK PROGRESS, (Mar. 6, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://perma.cc/FV86-RKH3 (quoting Nancy
Reagan’s famous “Just Say No” speech, which kick-started a new education campaign
aimed at school-age children in the 1980’s).
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caused a public health crisis, promoted crime, and hurt the economy. 123 In
response, the DEA has historically used the war on drugs to increase
incarceration via mandatory minimum sentences for drugs offenses,124
increase militarization of state and local law enforcement agencies against
civilians,125 and allow an exponential increase in the use of civil forfeiture.126
Though the Obama Administration backed away from some of the uglier
aspects of the war on drugs such as mandatory minimum sentencing,127 it left
much of the policy intact.
A number of soft punishments are also collaterally attached to the
CSA. This presents numerous adverse, life-altering criminal and civil
sanctions for any individual who uses marijuana or is convicted of a
marijuana offense. The individual may lose employment opportunities,
unless employment protections are specifically listed in the state’s medical
marijuana laws, and such laws cannot protect within the context of federal
employment.128
Public-housing agencies that receive federal assistance are also
legally required to turn down or remove users of illegal drugs, including
marijuana.129 The housing agency or owner has wide latitude to investigate
possible drug activity and need only have “reasonable cause to believe” that
123. See, e.g., OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY iii, 74 (2015).
124. In 2014 alone, 1,561,231 people were arrested for drug-related charges, nearly half
of them involving marijuana. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 2 (2015). As of 2015, 49.5% of all federal prisoners and
15.7% of all state prisoners were serving sentences for drug offenses. E. ANN CARSON &
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015 14 tbl.9, 15 tbl.10
(Dec. 2016). The U.S. prison population has risen from roughly 300,000 in 1978 to more
than 1,500,000 in 2015, an increase of 500% during that time. Id. at 3 fig.2.
125. The Military Cooperation with Civilian Agencies Act of 1981 has been used
heavily to allow for militarization of local police. Military Cooperation with Civilian
Agencies Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1099 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 271–84
(2016)). The act allows the Department of Defense to provide “any equipment” without
exception to law enforcement personnel for “counter-drug” activities. 10 U.S.C. §§ 272,
281(a)(1) (2016).
126. Ford, Matt, The Bipartisan Opposition to Sessions’s New Civil-Forfeiture Rules,
ATLANTIC, (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/G2VW-PVZ7. Attorney General Sessions has
been a vocal proponent of the policy’s use, despite widespread, bipartisan condemnation of
the program for constitutional and policy reasons. Id. According to a study by The
Washington Post in 2015, civil forfeiture proceedings by federal and state law enforcement
agencies accounted for more property losses nationwide than all burglaries during the same
year. Ingraham supra note 88.
127. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Att’ys
& Assistant Att’y Gen. for Crim. Div. (Aug. 12, 2013) (available at https://perma.cc/JL6NPTCP. (relaxing mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines for U.S. attorneys prosecuting
drug cases).
128. See sources cited supra note 84. Federal employees in certain categories and
federal contractors may also be subject to random drug testing, which may subject them to
loss of employment, or, in the case of a contractor, federal funding and grants. 50 U.S.C.
§ 3343(b) (2015); 41 U.S.C. § 8102 (2016).
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13661–13662 (2016).
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illegal use is occurring and that such abuse “may interfere with the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.” 130
Additionally, individuals convicted of misdemeanors under the CSA
“become ineligible” to receive federally-backed student loans.131 Finally, the
individual is also subject to the qualification of their Second Amendment
rights, as discussed in much greater depth in parts II and III.
As the DEA’s parent agency, the DOJ is the main enforcement and
prosecution mechanism for the CSA and sets policy regarding marijuana
throughout the federal government. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
DOJ retains “broad discretion” in determining whom to prosecute and that
such decisions are “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”132 Until
recently, the DOJ used its broad discretion to prosecute all marijuana
offenders and attempt to obtain the maximum sentence possible, even when
marijuana had been legalized by the state.133 President Obama’s first term in
office, however, brought changes in the form of an administration, which
was, initially, much more sympathetic toward medical marijuana than its
predecessor.134 Beginning in 2009, the DOJ utilized its prosecutorial
discretion to issue new policies for states with comprehensive medical
marijuana and full legalization programs, releasing three memoranda to
publicly announce its enforcement priorities: the Ogden Memo,135 the Cole
Memo,136 and the Cole Recreational Memo.137
1. The Ogden Memo
Bringing sweeping changes to federal marijuana policy, the Ogden
Memo also brought to light a fundamental, and lightly-discussed, flaw in the
federal government’s anti-drug strategy, stating that the DOJ had to make
“efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and prosecutorial
130. Id. § 13661(b)(1)(B).
131. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS
FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF
SELECTED BENEFITS 6 (2005).
132. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
133. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, supra note 127.
134. KATHERINE VAN WORMER & DIANE RAE DAVIS, ADDICTION TREATMENT 66
(Cengage Learning, 4th ed., 2014) (describing the anti-marijuana efforts of President George
W. Bush’s administration, including both “extravagant” prohibitionist propaganda and a
fight against medical marijuana dispensaries).
135. Memorandum from David Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
selected U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19, 2009) (available at https://perma.cc/SFD9-GS57) [hereinafter
Ogden Memo].
136. Memorandum from James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to U.S.
Att’ys (June 29, 2011) (available at https://perma.cc/MS9C-VP3M) [hereinafter Cole
Memo].
137. Memorandum from James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to all U.S.
Att’ys (August 29, 2013) (available at https://perma.cc/DKX7-NC7Y) [hereinafter Cole
Recreational Memo].
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resources.”138 The DOJ indicated that while it would still prosecute
“significant” drug traffickers as a “core priority,” the agency’s limited
resources should not be expended on “individuals whose actions are in clear
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the
medical use of marijuana.”139 The Ogden Memo did however note that seven
types of conduct were federal enforcement priorities and would continue to
be prosecuted, including the “unlawful possession or use of firearms.”140141
The medical marijuana industry viewed the Ogden Memo as an
about-face from prior DOJ policy and it was interpreted as a “green light to
the open sale of marijuana” in states with medical regimes.142 This opinion
extended to the press and general public as well. Following its publication, a
front-page story about the Ogden Memo graced the New York Times
reporting that “people who use marijuana for medical purposes and those
who distribute it to them should not face federal prosecution, provided they
act according to state law.”143 Suddenly, an influx of new qualified patients
and dispensaries caused a backlash from critics of medical marijuana
programs144 and led the DOJ to amend its guidance just two years later.
2. The Cole Memo
It appears the DOJ viewed the public and industry reaction to the
Ogden Memo as an overreaction and unintended consequence that it
attempted to rectify with publication of the Cole Memo. 145 Principally, the
Cole Memo reiterated the seven activities of interest detailed in the Ogden
Memo and introduced a new distinction between qualified patients and
“[p]ersons who are in the business” of producing and selling marijuana or

138. Ogden Memo, supra note 135, at 1.
139. Id. at 1–2.
140. Id. at 2. This indicates conduct illegal under section 922(g)(3) of the Gun Control
Act.
141. The other six types of conduct are “violence; sales to minors; financial and
marketing activities inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or purposes of state law,
including evidence of money laundering activity and/or financial gains or excessive amounts
of cash inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law; amounts of marijuana
inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law; illegal possession or sale of
other controlled substances; or ties to other criminal enterprises.” Id. at 2.
142. Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L.
REV. 869, 881 (2013). Following publication of the Ogden Memo, National Public Radio
reported that more medical marijuana dispensaries were open in California than Starbucks,
and a Colorado-based magazine reported that the number of medical marijuana applicants
increased by more than 1,000 per week. Id. at 881 n.51.
143. David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States that Allow
Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2009), https://perma.cc/TJY6-LMZL.
144. See Caplan, supra note 6, at 127, 129–38 (describing both the influx of qualified
patients and dispensaries to states with legalized medical marijuana regimes and critical
responses both by local individuals and the author).
145. Cole Memo, supra note 136, at 1.
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who “facilitate such activities.”146 Oddly, the Cole Memo stated that the
Ogden Memo “was never intended to shield such activities from federal
enforcement action or prosecution, even where those activities purport to
comply with state law.”147
It has been argued that the DOJ’s reasoning and response in the Cole
Memo was justified148 because the Ogden Memo did contain caveats relating
to enforcement against private businesses.149 While it is true that the Ogden
Memo did state that commercial enterprises could be prosecuted even if
working legally within state laws,150 this language was not clearly conveyed
to the public, the media, or even within the legal system. To the contrary,
public commentary about the memo by the Obama Administration created a
“difficult ethical problem” for the DOJ.151 Following the enthusiastic
response to the Ogden Memo, the Obama Administration made no attempts
to rectify what it apparently considered a common misconception, with the
DOJ even dismissing one case against a California dispensary as moot due
to the memo’s guidance.152 This sentiment was echoed by numerous
defendants who were arrested and prosecuted153 as enforcement ramped up
surrounding the publication of the Cole Memo.154 To confuse matters further,
the DOJ amended its guidance again with the publication of a third memo.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. This would appear to contradict both the wording and implication of the prior
memo. Ogen Memo, supra note 135, at 1-2.
148. See Kamin & Wald, supra note 142, at 882 (stating that a “close reading of the
Ogden Memo shows that the optimistic interpretation of those who rushed into the marijuana
business in 2009 was either careless or delusional” and that there were “clear warnings about
the continued viability of the CSA”).
149. Ogden Memo, supra note 135, at 1–2. Specifically, the memo stated that the
“disruption of illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking networks” and “prosecution of
commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana” were still prosecutorial
priorities for the agency. Id.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Alex Kreit, Reflections on Medical Marijuana Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek
Justice, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (2012).
152. Kreit notes that the Obama Administration never made any public attempt to
delineate between qualified patients and dispensaries because Obama, while campaigning
for president in 2008, promised that, under his administration, the DOJ would leave the issue
of medical marijuana to the states and Attorney General Eric Holder reiterated this position
on numerous occasions, going so far as stating that “the policy is to go after those people
who violate both federal and state law.” Id. at 1036–37. Further, after seeing the public and
industry interpretation of the Ogden Memo, the Obama Administration made no efforts to
contest this interpretation publicly. Id. at 1037–38.
153. See Mont. Caregivers Ass’n, LLC v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148
(D. Mont. 2012); United States v. Washington, 887 F Supp. 2d 1077, 1090–91 (D. Mont.
2012); United States v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
154. Kamin & Wald, supra note 142, at 883–84 (stating that DOJ enforcement
increased in 2011 in comprehensive medical marijuana state including California,
Washington, Colorado, and Montana as a result of the Cole Memo). Following the
publication of the Cole Memo, the Obama DOJ appears to have taken a harsher stance on
medical marijuana raids than even George W. Bush’s DOJ, which became an issue of
contention during his 2012 re-election campaign. Kreit, supra note 151, at 1039; see Tim
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3. The Cole Recreational Memo
In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize
the recreational use of marijuana. Though the Cole Recreational Memo
largely addresses issues outside the scope of this Article, it does contain
notable and crucial policy changes from its predecessors. At the outset, the
DOJ reiterated the seven activities it considered to be its highest enforcement
priorities and stated that it would step in to prosecute individuals if it felt that
“state enforcement efforts [were] not sufficiently robust.”155 The Cole
Recreational Memo also set out two new pieces of guidance. First, the DOJ
instructed federal agencies and authorities to avoid consideration of the “size
or commercial nature of the marijuana operation alone as a proxy for
assessing whether marijuana trafficking implicates the [DOJ’s] enforcement
priorities.”156 Second, it appeared to carve out an exception for states with
well-regulated marijuana programs, stating “the existence of a strong and
effective state regulatory system, and an operation’s compliance . . . may
allay the threat that an operation’s size poses to federal enforcement
interests.”157
The Cole Recreational Memo appears to have been the DOJ’s
attempt to find a middle-ground between the Ogden and Cole memos and
resolve the conflicts created by their conflicting policies.158 Essentially, the
DOJ stated that if individual conduct did not fall within the seven
enforcement priorities it previously reiterated, it would leave enforcement as
a state matter.159 The DOJ also inserted caveats regarding dispensaries and
cultivation centers, stating that they could still run afoul of federal law, thus
being subject to prosecution.160 The status of these three memos is now in
question due to new enforcement guidelines recently issued under President
Donald Trump.
4. The Sessions Enforcement Memo
In early 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions published a new memo
containing guidance outlining the drastically-altered marijuana enforcement
priorities of the Trump Administration.161 Sessions, a long-time antiDickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE, (Feb. 16, 2012), https://perma.cc/9LEJJF9K.
155. Cole Recreational Memo, supra note 137, at 1–3.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id.
158. Melanie Reid, The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal Government Wants to
Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M.L. Rev. 169, 179 (2014).
159. Cole Recreational Memo, supra note 137, at 3.
160. Id. at 3–4.
161. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to all
U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018) (https://perma.cc/G2VK-37TR) [hereinafter Sessions Enforcement
Memo].
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marijuana crusader, has long sought methods to end marijuana legalization
so that users and providers may be jailed under federal law, even going so far
as to personally ask that members of Congress repeal the Rohrabacher-Farr
Amendment.162 Specifically, the Session Enforcement Memo rescinds
“previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement” prepared
by the DOJ under the Obama Administration, which includes the Ogden,
Cole, and Cole Recreational memos.163 Further, Sessions reiterated that the
DOJ maintains that “marijuana is a dangerous drug and that marijuana
activity is a serious crime.”164 In statements accompanying its publication,
Sessions indicated that, contrary to previous DOJ guidance that created
certain safe harbors, this memo “does not have safe harbors in it.”165
However, the memo does not currently have the force that Sessions implies.
Within the context of recreational legalization, the Sessions
Enforcement Memo is being viewed as a means of cracking down on existing
recreational programs, participants, and future legalization efforts,166 though
it is too early to know if this guidance will have the desired effect. In medical
marijuana states however, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment largely
prevents the DOJ from taking action against qualified patients or suppliers.167
Further, it may be argued that by publishing the memo, the DOJ has violated
Rohrabacher-Farr under even the most strident interpretations offered by
federal courts.168
5. The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment
On December 16, 2014, the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriation Act of 2015, which included the Rohrabacher-Farr

162. Christopher Ingraham, Jeff Sessions Personally Asked Congress to Let Him
Prosecute Medical-Marijuana Providers, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/W3DP-NJ4W; see also Rachel Revesz, Jeff Sessions, Donald Trump’s New
Attorney General, Said the Ku Klux Klan ‘Was OK Until I Found Out They Smoked Pot,’
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 18, 2016, 6:12 PM), https://perma.cc/27TC-ZY8M.
163. Sessions Enforcement Memo, supra note 161, at 1 & n.1.
164. Id. at 1.
165. Jeff Sessions Ends Policy That Let Legal Pot Flourish, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018,
2:47 PM), https://perma.cc/4PKN-KZFM.
166. Matt Zapotsky, Sari Horwitz & Joel Achenbach, Use of Legalized Marijuana
Threatened as Sessions Rescinds Obama-era Directive That Eased Federal Enforcement,
WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/H4G6-VUDW.
167. See sources cited and accompanying text infra notes 169, 183–89.
168. The Sessions Enforcement Memo will result in less participation in recreational
and medical marijuana programs—that was part of the overall point behind its publication.
But, because the purpose and effect of the memo were to halt the implementation of medical
marijuana programs in existing and future states, without evidence that the action was
undertaken using no congressional funding, it appears that the DOJ may have violated
Rohrabacher-Farr by releasing the memo. See supra notes 162, 166; see also infra notes
382-84.
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Amendment was signed into law.169 The amendment requires, without
exception, that the DOJ is precluded from using any “funds made available
in this Act,” meaning all funding available to the DOJ, “to prevent such States
from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”170 It should be noted that
the “States” refers not only to those states that have enacted comprehensive
medical marijuana programs, but also to others that allow only low-THC or
CBD products, creating an even greater zone of exclusion for the DOJ.171 On
its face, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment172 is a stunning piece of
legislation, given the current political climate and the usual deference paid to
law enforcement in America. It is an amendment that passed Congress with
bipartisan support, forbidding the DOJ, and its subsidiary agencies, from
enforcing any laws—not just the CSA—that would prevent states from
implementing or furthering their medical marijuana regimes.173
Initial implementation of the Amendment would prove difficult,
however. The DOJ’s response was to continue its business as usual, utilizing
the guidance provided in the Ogden, Cole, and Cole Recreational memos. 174
The DOJ interpreted Rohrabacher-Farr to mean that it could still pursue
qualified patients and private distributors, but not state actors who were off
limits, because to arrest or prosecute those individuals would prevent state
implementation.175 The authors of the Amendment viewed this as a brazen
attempt to skirt both the letter and the spirit the law and sent a demand letter
169. Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2130 § 538 (2014).
170. Id. § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217. See also id. at Title II, 128 Stat. at 2182 (listing the
operating budget of the DOJ). The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment enumerated the 33 states
where comprehensive and low-THC medical marijuana programs had been created at the
time. Id. § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217.
171. Id. § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217; see also supra note 33; see also infra Appendix, Table
1.
172. The amendment was originally named for U.S. Representatives Dana Rohrabacher
(Republican) and Sam Farr (Democrat). Following the retirement of Rep. Farr in January
2017, it was renamed the “Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment” after new co-sponsor
Rep. Earl Blumenhauer (Dem.). Alicia Wallace, 44 in Congress Support Effort to Keep DOJ
Handcuffed in Medical Cannabis States, THE CANNABIST, Apr. 10, 2017,
https://perma.cc/HM4R-7TXU.
173. See Voting Record for Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, https://perma.cc/2CCA3YH5 (last visited July 8, 2018); Pub. L. No. 113-235 § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217 (prohibiting
the use of any funds to prevent the enumerated states from “implementing their own laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana”).
174. Health Center from Dana Rohrabacher, United States House of Representatives
(May 5, 2016) (available at https://perma.cc/8CFJ-73SP; Jacob Sullum, Would The
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment Actually Stop Medical Marijuana Raids?, FORBES (June 3,
2014, 6:52 PM), https://perma.cc/GT7B-EADL (noting that a hypothetical DEA arrest of a
medical marijuana patient would not technically prohibit a state from implementing its own
laws regarding medical marijuana use).
175. David Downs, Updated: War on California Medical Marijuana Will Continue,
Justice Department Says, EAST BAY EXPRESS (April 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/D48WPUDN.
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to the DOJ, informing the agency that its interpretation was “emphatically
wrong.”176 The demand letter further alleged that the DOJ, tasked with
prosecuting federal laws, was itself violating federal law by undertaking an
action against a dispensary or qualified patient “acting in accordance with
state medical marijuana laws.”177 This did not sway the DOJ, which
continued to operate much as it had previously, essentially ignoring the
demand letter and subsequent request for investigation until federal courts
stepped in.
The first court to have a say in the matter was the Northern District
of California in United States v. Marin Alliance.178 The DOJ argued that the
funds described in the Amendment are not the same as those used by the
agency for “CSA enforcement actions against individuals or private
businesses because such actions do not prevent a State from implementing
its own laws.”179 The agency additionally argued that its prosecutions were a
mere “drop-in-the-bucket” that did not present any real impediment to
California’s implementation of its program.180 The district court was
unimpressed, holding that an “impermissible government intrusion” is not
rendered acceptable simply because “any one defendant is a small piece of
the legal landscape.”181 The district court went on to hold that all forms of
statutory interpretation argued against the DOJ’s position and was frank in
its assessment of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, stating,
Section 538 either allows the DOJ to shut down medical
marijuana dispensaries for violating the CSA, or it does not.
It contains no limitation that requires a State to implement
its medical marijuana laws in one way or not another—via
centralized state dispensary, for example, or through highly
regulated local private dispensaries—before Section 538’s
prohibition is triggered. Rather, Section 538 takes as a given
that States implement their medical marijuana laws in the
ways they see fit.182

176. Letter from Dana Rohrabacher & Sam Farr, Members of Cong., to Eric Holder,
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1 (April 8, 2015) (available at https://perma.cc/4E86-RUKC).
177. Id. at 2. After the DOJ failed to comply with the initial letter sent on April 8, 2015,
representatives Rohrabacher and Farr called for a formal investigation of the DOJ by the
Inspector General for admitted, flagrant violations of federal law. Letter from Sam Farr &
Dana Rohrabacher, Members of Cong., to Inspector Gen. Michael Horowitz (July 30, 2015),
https://perma.cc/D72D-R96Z.
178. United States v. Marin All., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1046–1047 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
179. Id. at 1044 (quoting Gov’t Supp. Brief at 6 & n.2 (dkt.272)).
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1044–45.
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The district court did note that the scope of each state’s laws imposed limits
on Rohrabacher-Farr, but any individual or private enterprise acting within
those parameters was outside the DOJ’s reach.183
Following Marin Alliance, the DOJ received another loss, this time
before the Ninth Circuit in United States v. McIntosh.184 In a sweeping ruling
that affects every enforcement action the DOJ undertakes with regard to
medical marijuana laws, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the RohrabacherFarr Amendment “prohibits DOJ from spending money on actions that
prevent the Medical Marijuana States’ giving practical effect to their state
laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical
marijuana.”185 The court then turned its analysis to individuals acting under
state medical marijuana laws. The court acknowledged that the DOJ may
prosecute individuals for violations of the CSA, but doing so prevents “the
state from giving practical effect to its law,” regardless of whether state
officials are the targets of prosecution, because “state law provides for nonprosecution of individuals who engage in such conduct.”186
The court then moved to the more difficult question of scope, though
the difficulty arises from the variable nature of state laws, not federal.187 Due
to the wording of the Amendment, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the DOJ
is prohibited from “preventing the implementation of those specific rules of
state law that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of
medical marijuana” but may prosecute those individuals who “do not strictly
comply with all state-law conditions.”188 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion made it
clear that the DOJ was faced with a choice in forming its CSA enforcement
strategy. Although Congress stripped the DOJ of funding to impede medical
marijuana regimes, the DOJ could, theoretically, enforce federal marijuana
laws, provided the agency could also furnish some form of proof showing
that none of its congressional funding was expended therein.189
A plain reading of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment along with the
holdings of both Marin Alliance and McIntosh makes it apparent that the DOJ
and its subsidiary agencies, such as the DEA and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”), are currently precluded from investigating,
arresting, or prosecuting any participant that is acting in strict compliance
183. See id. at 1047 (gathering cases).
184. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016).
185. Id. at 1176.
186. Id. at 1176–77.
187. Id. at 1177–78. The court demurred at adopting the defendants’ expansive reading
of the Amendment, which would have required DOJ to “refrain from prosecuting ‘unless a
person’s activities are so clearly outside the scope of a state’s medical marijuana laws that
reasonable debate is not possible.’” Id. at 1177.
188. Id. at 1178 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 1179. Of course, such a showing would be difficult, if not impossible to
make in good faith, and, assuming it, would require the agency to run a deficit and likely
lead to slower prosecution, thus to possible Sixth Amendment constitutional violations.
Conversely, the DOJ could comply with federal law as it now stands.
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with state medical marijuana laws. Thus it seems that qualified patients have
won a monumental victory against the federal government, though it may be
transitory in nature for two reasons. First, Attorney General Sessions has
actively attempted to have Rohrabacher-Farr repealed in future spending
measures as part of his ongoing crusade against marijuana.190 Second,
because Rohrabacher-Farr was implemented as a rider, it must be
reauthorized by Congress or it will become ineffective and thus cease to
protect medical marijuana regimes and participants, effectively granting
Sessions the enforcement latitude he seeks.191 Currently, the RohrabacherFarr Amendment has been reauthorized through September 30, 2018, though
its long-term prospects are being hotly debated.192193 Thus the reality for any
qualified patient is that, while she may be protected by medical marijuana
laws, she is still violating federal law and subject to the actions of a DOJ keen
to enforce the CSA.
II. SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
This Part addresses the current state of Second Amendment
jurisprudence in America, its application in a post-Heller world, and its
intersection with the qualified patient. Section A describes the confusing and
somewhat unhelpful text of the majority’s decision in Heller as a necessary
prerequisite for further discussion of individual category qualification.
Section B discusses the two-part qualification analysis that federal circuit
courts created to fill the void left by Heller. Section B also briefly describes
application of the qualification analysis as applied to individuals adjudicated
as mentally-ill and users of illegal drugs as well as recent policy provided by
the ATF to federal firearms dealers.
Although it was not the first piece of legislation to qualify the right
to bear arms at the federal level,194 the Gun Control Act, enacted in 1968, is
the federal government’s predominant means of qualification today and
190. See Ingraham, supra note 162.
191. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 542, 129 Stat.
2242, 2332–33 (2015).
192. The Amendment was subsequently extended via a spending stopgap bill that
extended all funding levels until January 19, 2018 but did not resolve issues between the
parties. Alex Pasquariello, Trump Signs Stopgap Spending Bill Extending Federal Medical
Marijuana Protections a Few More Weeks, CANNABIST, (Dec. 22, 2017, 11:07 AM),
https://perma.cc/Q8WK-SLWH. Rohrabacher-Farr’s future is undecided, however, as the
House Rules Committee removed it from consideration for the 2018 funding bill, but the
Senate Appropriations Committee had previously included the language. Alicia Wallace,
Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Medical Marijuana Protections Extended by Debt Limit Deal,
CANNABIST (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://perma.cc/2FVC-QPYB.
193. As of this writing, the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment has been extended to
September 30, 2018. Senators Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect State Marijuana
Laws, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT (last updated June 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/67DFUTSU.
194. See sources cited infra notes 310, 319.
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made firearms possession unlawful for individuals convicted of any felony,
unlawful aliens, any user of or person addicted to “marihuana,”195 and any
person who had been “adjudicated as a mental defective.”196
A. An Awkward Landmark Decision
District of Columbia v. Heller is a momentous case that radically
changed the reading of the Second Amendment for federal courts.197 It is well
beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the factual background of the case,
as we are instead much more concerned with its consequences, both intended
and otherwise.
For the purpose of this Article’s analysis, Heller can be divided into
two unequal sections, with only the second being applicable. The first,
consisting of the decision’s initial 56 pages is a textual analysis of the Second
Amendment’s prefatory and operative clauses, and its post-ratification
commentaries.198 The second, comprising the final nine pages, provides the
only guidance for a ruling that would completely alter one of, if not the most,
contentious constitutional and political questions of recent times.199
The ruling’s second section also contains its only discussion of
qualification of the newly-expanded right to bear arms where the majority
noted that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by Second Amendment is not
unlimited.”200 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, would cause no small
amount of discussion and disagreement for federal courts in the years
following the decision, in stating that “nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill,” which the Court described as “presumptively
lawful.”201 These two specifically-named individual category qualifications
form the so-called constitutional safe harbor.202

195. Spelling “marijuana” with an “h” instead of a “j” is now commonly viewed as both
“archaic” and racially insensitive in academic circles as it hearkens back to early 20th
century attempts by prohibitionists to tie marijuana to “despised minority groups” such as
Mexican immigrants by virtue of a spelling that would “sound Mexican.” Christopher
Ingraham, ‘Marijuana’ or ‘Marihuana’? It’s All Weed to the DEA, WASH. POST (Dec. 16,
2016), https://perma.cc/LK6N-R9JL. Despite these connotations, the DEA continues to use
the outmoded spelling, even as recently as December 2016. Id.
196. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(4), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2017)).
197. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 104–07 (D.D.C. 2004)
(noting that every federal circuit court save one rejected the notion that an individual right to
bear arms existed untied to military or militia service, with the Fifth Circuit being the lone
exception).
198. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570–626 (2008).
199. See id. at 626–36.
200. Id. at 626.
201. Id. at 626–27 & n.26.
202. See sources cited infra notes 218, 220–21.
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Before closing, Justice Scalia noted his disdain for Justice Breyer’s
dissent, particularly the suggestion that the Court should “establish a level of
scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions” either via the
traditional scrutiny tests or an “‘interest-balancing’ approach.”203 Justice
Breyer’s interest-balancing approach, perhaps, rather presciently, would
have required courts to evaluate “the interests protected by the Second
Amendment on one side and government public-safety concerns on the
other” with the sole issue being “whether the regulation at issue
impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter.”204
Justice Scalia viewed any such approach as a blatant constitutional endaround, meant to avoid his originalist interpretation of the Second
Amendment.205 This majority admitted, however, that it left “so many
applications of the right to keep and bears arms in doubt.”206
Justice Breyer would lose the day, as his argument was relegated to
a dissent,207 but history appears to have proven him the most prescient of the
justices from the Heller decision, at least in the short-term.208 The interestbalancing approach described in his dissent is quite similar to that which is
used by federal courts to rule on Second Amendment cases today, and he
correctly surmised that the majority’s decision would “encourage legal
challenges to gun regulation throughout the Nation.”209
B. The Post-Heller Two-Step Qualification Analysis
Following Heller, Americans have, for the first time, a fundamental
right to possess firearms for the “core lawful purpose of self-defense.”210 Yet,
the decision failed to create a test to decide the “who, what, where, when,
and why”211 of qualification under the Gun Control Act. Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit would later hold that the Supreme Court “resolved the Second
Amendment challenge in Heller without specifying any doctrinal ‘test’ for
resolving future claims.”212 By failing to enunciate any standard of review,
the Supreme Court left gaps to be filled by the various judicially-imposed
approaches the majority had sought to avoid.

203. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
204. Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.B.
205. Id. at 634–35 (citing Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)).
206. Id. at 635.
207. Id. at 681–723 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. See, e.g., Violence Policy Ctr., U.S. Gun Death Rate Jumps 17 Percent Since 2008
Supreme Court District of Columbia v. Heller Decision Affirming Right to Own a Handgun
for Self-Defense (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/AT8V-B4Q2.
209. Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 630.
211. United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
212. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011).
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In the absence of specific direction, the Third Circuit created a
patchwork two-part test,213 which was subsequently adopted by all federal
circuit courts, though its application varies to some degree.214 When a federal
firearms qualification is challenged, the court will analyze the regulation by
asking two questions. First, the court asks “whether the challenged law
burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”215 If the court
answers in the affirmative, it will then proceed to the second step and ask:
Does the regulation in question pass “muster under any appropriate level of
scrutiny?”216 The circuits do differ in their treatment if the answer to the first
question is not an unequivocal “yes.” Many will end the inquiry there,
allowing the qualification to stand, though others appear to view such an
action as incautious and allow the inquiry to proceed to the second step.217
Initially, the first step appears to be a simple proposition involving a
brief restatement of the statutory context for the regulation in question. The
difficulty is multiplied, however, when the analysis attempts to compare the
qualification in question with the possible constitutional safe harbor named
in Heller218 or measure whether a regulation is “longstanding” and
“presumptively lawful.”219 Federal circuit courts are split in regard to the
existence of a constitutional safe harbor, or initial presumption of validity,
for the two individual category qualifications named in Heller: those
restricting firearm ownership by felons and individuals adjudicated as

213. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d. Cir. 2010).
214. See Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 347–48 n.9 (1st. Cir. 2015) (gathering
cases from every other federal circuit court, save the Eleventh Circuit, utilizing the postHeller two-step process). The Eleventh Circuit has since adopted this framework as well.
See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.
2015).
215. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)). Some circuits alter the first question to add
“as historically understood” or a similar modifier, thus requiring a review of the historical
context for the qualification. See Jackson v. City & Cty. Of S.F., 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.
2014) (amending the language in Chovan to add “based on a ‘historical understanding of the
scope of the [Second Amendment] right,’ or whether the challenged law falls within a ‘welldefined and narrowly limited’ category of prohibitions ‘that have been historically
protected’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 680).
216. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 788 F.3d at 1324.
217. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
court is not “obliged to impart a definitive ruling at the first step” and may proceed to the
second step when such a move is deemed “prudent” (citing Nat’l Rifle Ass’n. of Am. v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012));
United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2012).
218. See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and
McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1142–44 (2011) (discussing the safe harbor question in
greater depth).
219. Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and
“Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 562–64 (2014) (describing the varying
approaches and opinions, even amongst federal courts, to such regulations).
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mentally-ill.220 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has ruled that qualifications
against felons are presumptively valid and fall within a constitutional safe
harbor, meaning challenges to the qualification are almost certain to fail.221
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has found that no safe harbor exists and has
instead used the two-step process to find felon-in-possession statutes
constitutional after applying intermediate scrutiny analysis.222 The Sixth
Circuit goes further still, holding that the use of the Supreme Court’s list to
find a safe harbor too closely approximates rational-basis review, which was
expressly rejected as a means of review for Second Amendment cases by
Heller.223
Prior to venturing beyond step one, federal courts may make another
inquiry, taken from the text of Heller, which asks whether the individual
category qualification is “longstanding”224 and “presumptively lawful.”225
An affirmative answer will end the two-step test altogether in some courts,226
while others consider the question to be useful, though not dispositive.227
Again, much of the confusion appears to have been caused by the text of
Heller. Though Justice Scalia stated that the individual category
qualifications against both felons and those adjudicated as mentally-ill were
“longstanding,” such regulations were not codified federally in their current
form until 1968.228 Even if we assume that these two qualifications are
unquestionably valid, this raises an additional question: Why did the Court
single out these two as longstanding and not the others? Further, the phrase
“presumptively lawful” is taken from a footnote,229 which has led some
defendants and even federal courts to argue it is dicta,230 creating more
confusion. Finally, it may also be argued that questions regarding
220. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
221. See United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 2016); Chovan, 735
F.3d at 1144–45; United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1116–18 (9th Cir. 2010).
222. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 691–94 (7th Cir. 2010).
223. United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2012).
224. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
225. Id. at 627 n.26.
226. See Pratt, supra note 219, at 562 & n.130.
227. See id. at 562 & n.131.
228. Though some evidence does exist that shows felons were banned from possessing
firearms during the common law era, this evidence is inconclusive, and both scholars and
federal courts are divided as to the import of such historical context. See United States v.
Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing both sides of the
“longstanding” argument and finding no consensus). The same argument applies to
individuals adjudicated as mentally ill, where historical records are again inconclusive. See
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t 837 F.3d 678, 688–90 (6th Cir. 2016).
229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 n.26.
230. See Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). Conversely, the Fifth Circuit Court has specifically described the
phrase as dicta, though it still upheld the felon-in-possession qualification as previously
precedential within the circuit. United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009)).
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longstanding and presumptive validity or constitutional safe harbors only
apply to facial challenges to the Gun Control Act because as-applied
challenges are based on the individual’s particular set of circumstances, thus
rendering such distinctions inappropriate where situations warrant.231
Based on these numerous questions, each with no good or final
answers, it is probably best to approach the first step utilizing the Seventh
Circuit’s observation that it is not “profitable to parse these passages of
Heller as if they contained an answer to the question.”232 If the court finds
the first step has been met, or it defers, the test moves on.
The second step requires the court to analyze the qualification in
question using one of the three constitutional standards of review: rational
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.233 While this Article does note
some shortcomings of the Heller decision, the Court did limit review by
rejecting rational basis review of Second Amendment rights and stated that
if rational basis was “all that was required to overcome the right to keep and
bear arms . . . the Second Amendment . . . would have no effect.”234 Federal
circuit courts have also held that Heller provided guidance in regard to the
use of intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis by comparing constitutional
evaluations of First and Second Amendment rights.235
As such, federal courts treat scrutiny analysis of Second Amendment
rights in much the same manner that they do for First Amendment rights.
Within the context of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that
strict scrutiny analysis is applicable to any law which seeks to regulate the
content of a message.236 Intermediate scrutiny analysis, on the other hand,
applies to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.237
Applying this reasoning to Second Amendment jurisprudence, courts have
ruled that strict scrutiny analysis should apply to “any law that would burden
the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding
citizen.”238 However, once qualification moves to conduct outside the home,
those regulations are measured via intermediate scrutiny analysis.239 The
reason behind narrow, strict scrutiny application in the context of the Second
231. See also Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller’s Collateral Damage: As-Applied
Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 1989–91
(2018) (considering how the Supreme Court and circuit courts have addressed the as-applied
challenges presented in Heller).
232. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
233. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1077–80 (2011).
234. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
235. See id. at 582, 595, 625–26, 635 for scrutiny comparisons; United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (describing the application of First Amendment guidance to
Second Amendment challenges as “the natural choice” due to Justice Scalia’s repeated
comparisons).
236. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
237. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
238. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011).
239. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015).
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Amendment is due to the “inherent risks to others” posed by possessing
firearms in public.240
The Seventh Circuit is the lone federal circuit to substantively alter
post-Heller qualification analysis. Like its sister circuits, the Seventh follows
the first step, but diverges at the second. There, the Seventh looks to the type
of qualification in question to determine what level of scrutiny to use. If it is
total in nature where “law-abiding, responsible citizens” would regularly be
entitled to full solicitude, it will apply strict scrutiny. 241 Whereas, if the
qualification is categorical in nature, such as the law preventing convicted
domestic abuser from possessing firearms, the Seventh Circuit will require
the government to make a “form of strong showing” similar to intermediate
scrutiny.242 The stated reasoning for this is that the court does not wish to
become mired in the “‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”243
Once the level of scrutiny has been established, the government must
provide enough evidence to meet the burden of proof. In cases challenging
individual category qualifications under intermediate scrutiny, the amount is
determined by reference to the length and breadth of the “temporal
limitation” imposed. Courts have routinely held that users of illegal drugs are
subject to a “limited temporal reach,” meaning the limitation can be removed
at any time by the individual ceasing her illegal conduct,244 while felons and
individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill experience permanent temporal
limitations because they cannot obtain relief from this disability.245
Currently, no hard-and-fast rule exists calculating the amount of evidence
required, however, the Supreme Court has held that the amount will “vary up
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”246 This
language has been interpreted to mean that a permanent temporal limitation
requires a greater evidentiary showing than one that is temporary in nature.247
The government may offer numerous types of evidence to meet its burden,
“including legislative history, empirical evidence, case law, and even
common sense, but it may not rely upon mere anecdote and supposition.”248
Enacted by Congress in 1968, the Gun Control Act originally
allowed individuals who had previously been subject to qualification and
later had their civil rights restored under federal law to petition for restoration
of their Second Amendment rights under the relief-from-disabilities
240. Id.
241. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2011).
242. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
243. Id. at 642.
244. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2016)
(citation omitted). See cases cited and accompanying text infra notes 331–32.
245. Tyler, 837 at 697–98.
246. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000); but see cases cited
infra note 249-52.
247. See, e.g., Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694; United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411,
418–21 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010).
248. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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provision.249 In 1992, however, Congress passed an appropriations act, which
contained a rider requiring that “none of the funds appropriated herein shall
be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief . . . under 18
U.S.C. 925(c).”250 That provision prohibits the ATF from expending funds to
review applications for relief from federal firearms qualification and has been
subsequently reauthorized by Congress annually.251 Congress later renewed
a wholly-voluntary, federally-funded, state-run relief-from-disabilities
program that applied solely to individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill, though
only 31 states had done so in 2016.252
1. Individuals Adjudicated as Mentally-Ill
The Gun Control Act permanently qualifies the Second Amendment
rights of any individual who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective or
who has been committed to a mental institution,” with limited exceptions.253
Though these individuals are viewed similar to felons due to the language of
Heller, challenges to this provision of the Gun Control Act are much less
frequent254 and are treated much differently. Because the Gun Control Act
does not define “committed to a mental institution,” federal courts must rely
on state definitions in many cases.255 Further, the technical and factual
minutiae of these cases are closely scrutinized, as voluntary and temporary
committal does not qualify as commitment.256 It is interesting then that a
recent Sixth Circuit case provides a roadmap for showing that a qualification,
even one that is longstanding and presumptively lawful, may be found
unconstitutional, even under intermediate scrutiny analysis.
In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sherriff’s Department, an individual
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase a firearm in 2011 due to disclosing an
involuntary commitment to an in-patient mental health evaluation center in
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 925 (2016).
250. The Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993,
Pub L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992).
251. Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, division H, tit. II at 2583 (2015).
252. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 682–83 (quoting NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-180 §§ 103,105, 122 Stat. 2559, 2567-70 (2008)).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2016); see also Tyler, 837 F.3d at 682–83.
254. The number of published cases makes this disparity in frequency evident. On
Lexis, a search of “committed to a mental institution” AND “Gun Control Act” since June
26, 2008 (when Heller was decided) yielded 41 cases, while a search for “felon” AND “Gun
Control Act” for the same time period yielded 162 cases.
Search Results for Gun Control Act and Various Terms After June 26, 2008, LEXIS
ADVANCE RESEARCH, https://perma.cc/QGA4-GXZN (enter ““committed to a mental
institution” AND “Gun Control Act”“ in the search box; limit results by date 06/26/2008 to
present; repeat with ““felon” AND “Gun Control Act”“).
255. See United States v. McIlwain, 772 F.3d 688, 693–97 (11th Cir. 2014) (compiling
cases and applying Alabama law to determine whether commitment had occurred); United
States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2012) (relying on Maine law to define
“commitment”).
256. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2017); see also Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 50.
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1986.257 Tyler left the hospital of his own volition and psychiatrists later
testified that during a 2012 psychological evaluation, he reported “never”
experiencing a subsequent depressive episode and was observed to show “no
signs of mental illness.”258 Tyler sued numerous government officials for asapplied violations of his Second Amendment rights after he was denied the
purchase of a firearm by a federal dealer.259 The Sixth Circuit applied the
post-Heller two-step process and intermediate scrutiny analysis.260
The majority found that although Congress has an important
government interest in keeping firearms away from “presumptively risky
people,” Tyler’s constitutional rights had still been violated.261 Further, the
court ruled that while the government’s interest was of utmost importance,
the restriction used was not a reasonable fit to that objective.262 In order to
pass intermediate scrutiny, the government was required to show that there
was a “continued risk presented by people who were involuntarily committed
many years ago and who have no history of intervening mental illness,
criminal activity, or substance abuse” but without doing so, the court had “no
way of knowing” if the ban was only “‘somewhat over-inclusive’ or if it is
much more so.”263 The government’s “biggest problem,” however, was the
change made by Congress allowing relief-from-disability for some
individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill, which the court viewed as an implicit
statement from Congress that it did not consider those individuals to be more
dangerous than the public.264 The government’s case also failed due to its
inability to back its contentions via longitudinal evidence specific to
individuals like Tyler.265 The majority was sympathetic to the government’s
concerns and possible public dangers but held that the federal government
could not satisfactorily assert that a permanent temporal limitation on the
possession of firearms was reasonably necessary, at least in the case of an
individual like Tyler.266
The government argued that formerly committed individuals are
more dangerous than the general public using a number of studies as
evidence, but the court ruled that none were applicable to Tyler and were

257. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 684.
258. Id. at 683–84.
259. Id. at 684.
260. Id. at 692–93.
261. Id. at 693, 697–99 (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 699.
263. Id. at 698–99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id. at 697 (citations omitted); see also sources cited supra notes 248–51.
265. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694–98.
266. Id. at 697. Because Congress had, until 1992, used a relief-from-disabilities
program and had subsequently reauthorized the program to be implemented by the states, the
majority felt Congress did not believe all committed individuals to be permanently
dangerous and could therefore not rule as such. Id.; see id. at 682–83 (quoting NICS
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180 §§ 103,105, 122 Stat. 2559,
2567–70 (2008)).
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therefore anecdotal, at best.267 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the studies but
found that, “without any longitudinal evidence documenting that previously
committed people, on average, pose a greater threat of violence than
members of the general public,” the government did not meet its burden
under intermediate scrutiny analysis.268
2. Users of Illegal Drugs
The Gun Control Act also makes it illegal for any individual who
uses or is addicted to illegal drugs to possess a firearm.269 The federal
government, meanwhile, asserts that because users of illegal drugs are more
violent than the general population—according to Congress—those
individuals should have their right to bear arms qualified.270 This is known
as the “psychopharmacological model of violence” theory, which posits that
“ingesting a psychoactive substance. . . . may lead to a volatile, unrestrained
state that precipitates a violent act.”271 Similar to other individual category
qualifications, federal circuit courts have unanimously found section
922(g)(3) to be constitutional, though they differ as to the amount of evidence
the federal government must produce.272 The Fourth Circuit, remanded a case
in order to allow the parties to “substantiate the fit between [section]
922(g)(3) and the government’s important interest in protecting the
community from gun violence”273 using scientific studies. When reviewing
these challenges, some federal courts appear loathe to differentiate between
the various types of illegal drugs the individual used or is alleged to have
used, even where marijuana is not the sole drug in question.274 And this is not
267. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694–97.
268. Id. at 698.
269. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2017).
270. See Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 463–64 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d
681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010).
271. Carrie B. Oser et al., The Drugs Violence Nexus Among Rural Felony
Probationers, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1285, 1286–87 (2009) (citations omitted).
272. Numerous courts have held the provision to be constitutional, seemingly without
evidence. See United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Richard, 350 F. App’x
252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009).
273. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 463–64.
274. The Fourth Circuit, for example, stated it was under no requirement to make a
“particularized demonstration” specifically regarding marijuana use and violence after
finding ruling all drugs users are more violent than the general public based upon scientific
studies and government surveys that did not differentiate between cocaine and marijuana
users. Id. at 467–70. Regardless of personal opinion on the subject of marijuana legalization,
the idea that users of cocaine, a potent stimulant, may be placed into the same study
alongside users of marijuana, a hallucinogen and depressant, in order to determine whether
the drugs cause violent behavior in individuals without controlling for such variables is
laughable at best. WORLD HEALTH ORG., NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCE USE
AND DEPENDENCE 84–86, 89 (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health et al. eds., 2004).
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a one-off decision, as the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning used in United
States v. Carter (Carter II) without question when ruling that the Gun Control
Act applied equally to qualified patients as any other users of illegal drugs.275
In order to enforce the federal ban on firearms possession by marijuana users
in the age of increasing acceptance and use of medical marijuana, the ATF
recently released its policy regarding firearms sales to qualified patients.
ATF OPEN LETTER: Published on September 21, 2011, the Open
Letter276 contained guidance handed down from the ATF to apprise federallylicensed firearms sellers of the agency’s policy regarding sales to qualified
patients and marijuana users. Specifically, the ATF Open Letter requires that
licensees must refuse any firearms transaction to a person they have
“reasonable cause to believe” is a user of marijuana.277 Reasonable cause may
include, but is not limited to, “an inference of current use” drawn from
“evidence of recent use or possession” or a “pattern of use or possession that
reasonably covers the present time.”278 The ATF’s policy provides no
exceptions, even where medical marijuana has been legalized and the
individual is a qualified patient.279 By publishing the policy, the ATF
knowingly drafted firearms licensees into its service to police marijuana
users and qualified patients based on little more than bare suspicion or
inference.280 The ATF Open Letter has been upheld as a valid policy measure
by the Ninth Circuit,281 though it is still a controversial measure.282
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION
This Part seeks to unite parts I and II by showing that the state laws
legalizing medical marijuana are constantly and consistently undermined by
federal law on marijuana, because it forces qualified patients to choose
between therapeutic medicine and the right to bear arms. Further, this Part
will explain why qualified patients should not only be afforded their Second
Amendment rights, but also offers guidance on future challenges to the Gun
Control Act. Section A discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in
275. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1094.
276. Arthur Herbert, Open Letter to all Federal Firearms Licensees, BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES (Sept. 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/WJX6FN6X.
277. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3)).
278. Id. (quoting 27 C.F.R. § 478.11).
279. Id.
280. When purchasing a firearm from a federal licensee, an individual must complete
ATF Form 4473 and is compelled by federal law to make a candid admission of use of
illegal drugs, which asks if the individual is a user of illegal drugs and notes that medical
marijuana legalization does not affect federal laws criminalizing marijuana use or possession
at question 11.e. Id.; see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES,
FORM 4473, FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD (revised Oct. 2016).
281. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016).
282. See generally Steve Byas, Use Pot – Even Medical Marijuana – and Lose your
Second Amendment Rights, NEW AM. (Jan. 16, 2018) https://perma.cc/D57K-XKAG.
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Wilson v. Lynch, which made use of the post-Heller two-step test qualify the
Second Amendment rights of a qualified patient. Section B describes the
shortcomings of Wilson’s use of that test, as well as its application to similar
questions in the future. Finally, Section C will discuss why the DOJ, DEA,
and ATF’s enforcement of the CSA or Gun Control Act is currently illegal
under application of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.
A. Modest Collateral Burdens: Wilson v. Lynch
In 2000, Nevada enacted comprehensive medical marijuana
legalization for which the plaintiff, S. Rowan Wilson, registered in 2011,
becoming a qualified patient.283 In October of the same year, Wilson
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase a firearm from a federally-licensed
seller.284 Although Wilson claimed that her registration was intended to
“convey a particularized message in support of medical use of marijuana”
and that she never used marijuana,285 the firearms dealer had recently learned
of the ATF Open Letter.286 After the sale was refused, Wilson sued the
Attorney General and ATF, alleging numerous violations of her
constitutional rights.287
Based upon circuit precedent for challenges to the Gun Control Act
set by United States v. Chovan, the Ninth Circuit applied its version of the
post-Heller two-step test to Wilson’s claims.288 The court held that part one
was satisfied because the legislation in question and the ATF Open Letter
each “directly burden her core Second Amendment right to possess a
firearm” by “preventing Wilson from purchasing a firearm.”289 Before
proceeding to step two, the court determined that intermediate scrutiny
analysis was appropriate, as the burden to Wilson was “not severe.”290
Wilson conceded that the government has a substantial interest in
preventing gun violence, but argued that application of the Gun Control Act
was unconstitutional because her registration was merely an act of political
283. See NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 38; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.200 (LexisNexis
2017).
284. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1089.
285. Id. at 1095.
286. Wilson completed ATF Form 4473 but did not answer question 11.e, which led the
firearms seller to refuse the transaction. Id. at 1089–90; see also supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
287. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1090. Wilson asserted that section 922(d)(3), (g)(3) of the Gun
Control Act, title 27 Code of Federal Regulations section 478.11, and the ATF Open Letter
all violated her Second Amendment rights. Id. Additionally, Wilson alleged violations of her
First and Fifth Amendment rights and that the ATF Open Letter violated the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id.
288. Id. at 1092 (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir.
2013)).
289. Id. at 1092.
290. Id. at 1093 (holding that Wilson could have obtained firearms before becoming a
qualified patient or given up her status altogether).
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speech but also because application wrongly deprives qualified patients of
their constitutional rights by deeming them more violent simply by virtue of
their status as qualified patients.291 The government, meanwhile, contended
that empirical data from scientific studies supports a “strong link between
drug use and violence” and that the Gun Control Act should be applied to
qualified patients as any other illegal drug users.292
This link, the court argued, is of particular importance because
Congress’ purpose in creating the Gun Control Act was to keep firearms
away from “presumptively risky people.”293 If illegal drugs users, including
qualified patients, are more likely to act violently than the general public, the
government may argue that the regulation is both important and a reasonable
fit. Based upon the evidence presented in Carter II294 and reasoning that
marijuana users are “more likely” to engage in illegal conduct to obtain
marijuana, the Ninth Circuit agreed that a link exists between marijuana use
and violence.295 The court did note that its concerns about violence
perpetrated by qualified patients may be overstated because they “often
suffer from debilitating illnesses, for which marijuana may be an effective
palliative,” but did not alter its holding in any meaningful way.296
Wilson contended that the government’s purported reasonable fit
could not apply to her as she was a qualified patient for political purposes
only, an assertion that resonated with the Ninth Circuit, though not
sufficiently to rule in her favor.297 Further, she alleged that the ATF Open
Letter effectively made any federally-licensed firearms dealer into a police
officer so long as they have “reasonable cause to believe” an individual is a
marijuana user while still allowing dealers to make a “blanket assertion”
finding that any qualified patient is a marijuana user “without any
investigation or due process.”298 The Ninth Circuit, however, disregarded
these claims by favorably comparing these actions to Terry Stops made by
police who reasonably believe an individual to be armed and dangerous.299
The court further held that the ATF’s policy “simply clarifies that a firearms
dealer has ‘reasonable cause to believe’ an individual is an unlawful user if
291. Id. at 1093–95.
292. Id. at 1093 (citing United States v. Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 466–69 (4th
Cir. 2014)); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010). Though neither
party offered evidence to back their assertions, the Ninth Circuit accepted the government’s
contentions based on evidence accepted in two prior holdings from the Fourth and Seventh
circuits, both of which applied the Gun Control Act to marijuana users. Wilson, 835 F.3d at
1093–95.
293. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted).
294. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467–69.
295. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1094.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1094–95.
298. Id. at 1099–1100.
299. Id. at 1095 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). The court’s reasoning
here does nothing to rebut claims that the ATF Open Letter is a vast overreach of police
power without concern for due process.
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she holds a registry card” and therefore raises no due process concerns.300 A
distinction without a difference if ever one could be said to exist.
To the court and government, the resolution was imminently
reasonable, if inconvenient to qualified patients: Congress passed the Gun
Control Act in order to prevent gun violence and included a qualification
against illegal drug users because it found such individuals to be more violent
than the general public based on the psychopharmacological model of
violence; qualified patients use marijuana, which is an illegal drug under
federal law; therefore, qualified patients are illegal drug users and thus
subject to the same qualifications as other illegal drug users, whether they
share the same characteristics or obtained a registry card for other reasons.301
Any, admittedly possible, constitutional violations visited upon qualified
patients, the court stated, are simply “modest collateral burdens” that are to
be tolerated.302
B. Applying the Two-Step Test to Qualified Patients Appropriately
Admittedly, the Wilson decision is not entirely analogous to the bulk
of cases that courts are likely to adjudicate in the future involving qualified
patients and challenges to the Gun Control Act. Wilson registered solely as
an expression of her views on the subject of marijuana legalization and did
not use the substance.303 If we accept this as true, as the Ninth Circuit did,
then Wilson certainly posed no greater danger than any other member of the
general public and the government offered no evidence to the contrary. Yet,
the court still found the government’s argument persuasive and held that
Wilson’s constitutional rights had not been violated. This, perhaps
counterintuitively, is the precise reason a case like Wilson is so illustrative of
the problem faced by qualified patients nationwide.
Wilson presented the Ninth Circuit with a unique opportunity upon
which the court failed to capitalize. The Ninth Circuit maintains federal
appellate jurisdiction over nine states and two territories, of which all but two
states have created comprehensive medical marijuana programs304 covering
at least 2.1 million qualified patients.305 Rather than issue a narrow opinion
300. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1099–1100.
301. Id. at 1094–95.
302. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1095. Wilson unsuccessfully appealed the ruling to the
Supreme Court. Wilson v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1396 (2017) cert. denied.
303. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1095.
304. Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington all maintain programs while Idaho and the Northern Mariana Islands do not. See
infra Appendix, Table 1.
With the addition of Florida in the Eleventh Circuit and Louisiana in the Fifth Circuit, all
federal circuits now maintain appellate jurisdiction over at least one state with a
comprehensive medical marijuana regime. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
305. The Ninth Circuit is home to at least 88% of all qualified patients in the United
States. See ProCon.org, Number of Legal Medical Marijuana Patients (May 17, 2018),
https://perma.cc/E7SG-C8KK. This estimate notes the difficulty in accurately calculating
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on a complex and novel area of law, the court admittedly306 applied a
constitutionally-burdensome standard to all qualified patients. The following
analyzes the correct application of the post-Heller two-step test and explains
how the standard should be used in future cases involving qualified patients.
1. Does the Regulation Burden Conduct Protected by the Second
Amendment?
At a basic level, the answer to this question is likely an unequivocal
“yes.” Clearly, the Gun Control Act infringes upon a qualified patient’s
constitutional rights and the act of possession of a firearm is otherwise
protected by the Second Amendment following Heller. More context and
nuance will be required of future challenges, however, because some federal
circuits have expanded the first step inquiry to include historical context and
its bearing on narrow category prohibitions. Wilson did not face such
inquiries as she maintained she was not an unlawful drug user and thus, any
historical review at the first step was inapplicable to her case.307
While this Article argues that scientific evidence proves that
qualified patients are no more violent than the general public and that the
federal government cannot meet its burden under the two-part test for
individual category qualifications as-applied to qualified patients,308
marijuana is still illegal at the federal level under the CSA and qualified
patients who are admitted marijuana users must contend with that fact. This
alone likely ensures that qualified patients suing for restoration of their
Second Amendment rights will have to respond to questions that Wilson did
not.309
The first and most pressing of these questions concerns the historical
precedent for qualification of firearm possession for users of illegal drugs, a
numbers in states such as California and Washington, where registration programs are either
wholly elective or were not mandated until many years after creation, though the
methodology used has been cited as an accurate representation. Id. at nn.2, 6 & 9. No
estimate is available for Guam. Id.
306. Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1096.
307. Although numerous federal courts have weighed in on the meaning and import of
“longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” from Heller, illegal drug use was not mentioned
in reference to those terms, so qualified patients will likely be spared having to argue that
issue. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008).
308. Under the two-step test, the qualified patient would necessarily assert an asapplied challenge to section 922(g)(3). A facial challenge to the Gun Control Act would fail
under this context because a “person to whom a statute properly applies can’t obtain relief
based on argument that a differently situated person might present.” United States v. Skoien,
614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010). As-applied challenges, which asks a court to rule a
provision or section unconstitutional as-it-applies to the litigant, and / or similarly-situated
individuals, conversely, are the more common and preferred method to use to challenge to a
federal statute. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51
(2008); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
309. See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683–85 (7th Cir. 2010).
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highly-contentious issue. In a somewhat related matter, the issue of historic
precedent for felon-in-possession laws has been addressed numerous times
by federal courts, with no firm answer. Taking Heller at face value, a reader
would be inclined to believe that all felons had been barred from possessing
firearms long before 1968 and that the issue was well-settled,310 but that is
not the case. Not only are the federal circuit courts unsure on the matter, legal
scholars have debated the issue for many years, with no consensus
achieved.311
The debate on historicity is no less fraught—nor inconclusive—
when discussing qualifications for users of illegal drugs. Though most
federal circuit court cases involving section 922(g)(3) have avoided the
question of history all together,312 the Seventh Circuit did attempt an analysis
in Yancey.313 There, the court reviewed common law history and legal
precedent to find that “unvirtuous citizens” could have their Second
Amendment rights qualified.314
First, the court referenced Congress’s objectives in creating the Gun
Control Act before citing some 27 state and district laws that purportedly
outlawed firearms possession by illegal drug users—including qualified
patients—thus implying that Congress was not alone in viewing such
individuals as “unfit to possess firearms.”315 However, the Seventh Circuit’s
conclusion ignored the seven states that maintained comprehensive medical
marijuana programs at the time of the decision, five of which contained
language exempting qualified patients from abridgement of their rights and
privileges based on their status as qualified patients.316 According to Yancey,

310. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
311. See United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016);
compare C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 695, 708–19 (2009) (stating that forfeiture of weapons upon conviction of a
violent felony likely occurred during the common law era, but the felon was not barred from
possession after serving her prison sentence and that felon-in-possession laws were largely
nonexistent before World War I) with Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second
Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1362–
64 (2009) (discussing differences in felonious activities).
312. See, e.g., United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating that the court is not required to address the historical requirements behind step one
unless it holds that the government has not met its burden at step two); United States v.
Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
313. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683–85.
314. Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
315. Id. at 684.
316. Among the 27 states listed, California, Colorado, D.C., Hawaii, Nevada, New
Jersey, and Rhode Island each had comprehensive medical marijuana regimes, with
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, and Rhode Island each having laws exempting
qualified patients from such regulations. Moreover, all other states that have adopted
comprehensive programs and finalized their laws since Yancey was decided have created
similar exceptions. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
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this means that most states with comprehensive programs view qualified
patients as fit to possess firearms along with the general public.317
Second, the court tied qualifications for illegal drug users to felonin-possession laws, but noted the ongoing debate regarding the history of
felon-in-possession laws, especially those that include non-violent felons.318
That debate notwithstanding, the Seventh Circuit then opined that “most
scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied
to the concept of a virtuous citizenry.”319 As part of its basis for making this
statement, the court referenced a 1938 federal law that, it says, codified rules
against non-violent felons possessing firearms. Presumably, this is in
reference to the Federal Firearms Act, a law that only qualified firearms
possession for individuals who committed “crimes of violence” and made no
mention of either non-violent felonies or drug offenses.320
Regardless of the Seventh Circuit’s confusing statements, the
qualified patient should move beyond the first step as the historical basis for
qualification for illegal drug use is, at best, uncertain, and some federal
circuits will defer to the second step regardless.321 Indeed, marijuana was not
outlawed in most states until the 1930s322 and was not made a felony until
1937.323 Further, it is a non-violent felony and was not made a qualifying
offense until 1968.324 Prior to 1930s, however, we are left with the same
academic debate from Phillips325 and Yancey,326 which produces no hard
evidence to suggest that this qualification of illegal drug users has historical
merit. Conversely, it appears that medical marijuana use, as a non-violent
felony offense, would be categorized as an action that would not have
resulted in qualification prior to World War I.327 Therefore, this Article will
proceed to the second step.

317. Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684.
318. Id. at 685.
319. Id. at 684–85.
320. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 5-785, 52 Stat. 1250 §§ (6), (2)(e)-(f) (1938);
see also Marshall, supra note 311, at 729–30. Non-violent felonies and illegal drug use were
not added as qualifying offenses until the Gun Control Act 30 years later. See Pub. L. No.
90-618, § 922(d)(3), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2017)).
321. See sources supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
322. See Mikos, supra note 36, at 1427 n.14.
323. A precursor to the CSA, Congress approved the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937 as the
first federal ban on marijuana. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551.
The predecessor to the Marihuana Tax Act, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914,
regulated only cocaine and opium, though it is widely viewed as a catalyst for later federal
narcotics legislation. TODD GARVEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43435, MARIJUANA:
MEDICAL AND RETAIL – SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015); see also Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38
Stat. 785 (1914).
324. Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(d)(3), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(3) (2017)).
325. United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016).
326. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010).
327. See Marshall, supra note 311, at 698, 708.
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2. Does the Restriction or Regulation Pass Muster Under Any Appropriate
Level of Scrutiny?
Federal courts have unanimously agreed that individual category
qualifications stemming from the Gun Control Act should be analyzed under
an intermediate level of scrutiny.328 Though intermediate scrutiny has been
described in numerous ways, the Ninth Circuit in Chovan gave a particularly
efficient description of the government’s burden, requiring “(1) the
government’s stated objective to be significant, substantial, or important; and
(2) a reasonable fit between the challenged regulations and the asserted
objective.”329 As a preliminary matter, qualified patients should concede the
first part of the intermediate scrutiny analysis as the federal government’s
stated objective in creating and defending the Gun Control Act of keeping
“firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people” appears
ironclad.330 However, even conceding the first part, intermediate scrutiny still
requires the government to enunciate not only an appropriate objective but
also furnish proof that a reasonable fit exists between the regulation and the
objective.
The necessary amount of proof is determined by reference to the type
of temporal limitation imposed by the individual category qualification in the
Gun Control Act.331 Thus the question becomes whether the temporal
limitation, as applied to qualified patients, is permanent, limited, or perhaps
a third option? Federal circuit courts have routinely held that individuals
barred from possessing firearms under section 922(g)(3) suffer only a
temporary deprivation of their rights, reasoning that the qualification extends
only for the duration of the illegal conduct and applies solely to “current drug
users.”332 Wilson expanded that standard to qualified patients, stating that
such individuals could regain their Second Amendment rights at any time
“by surrendering [their] registry card[s].”333
It is quite unlikely that federal courts will consider the qualification
of qualified patients to be a permanent temporal limitation on par with
individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill or felons due to unanimous agreement
between the circuits in opposition to the idea. However, the status of qualified
328. See generally cases cited supra notes 234–40 (comparing federal appellate court
treatment of Second Amendment cases to First Amendment cases).
329. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)).
330. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983).
331. See generally cases cited supra notes 245–47
332. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States
v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d
832, 839 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jackson, 280 F.3d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 2002).
333. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016). While Wilson did not make
an argument based upon the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, it should be noted that the
actions of the DOJ and ATF are almost certain violations of that rule and should cease while
it is in effect. See infra note 363 and Part III.C.

160

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:1: 115

patients should not be regarded with the flippancy typically shown by federal
courts to illegal drug users or considered analogous with individuals under
domestic violence protective orders.334 Qualified patients represent a
different dynamic than the simple black-and-white formulation made by the
Gun Control Act, Wilson, or other federal court decisions. Whereas, courts
have instructed users of illegal drugs to abandon their use of narcotics to
avoid qualification, giving the same instructions to qualifying patients is a
far greater ask. In effect, giving such an ultimatum is akin to asking an
individual to choose between one of the most cherished constitutional rights
in all of American history and the use of medicine, as defined by a consensus
of the scientific and medical communities and by more than 30 states.335 This
is an unacceptable choice wrought by bad policy and a reliance on incorrect
science as common sense.
Though federal courts have heretofore recognized only two levels of
temporal limitation, qualified patients may represent a third level between
those that are truly limited and those that are permanent like in Tyler. An
intermediate temporal limitation, as it were. This third level would place the
amount of proof required somewhere between what was offered in Carter II
and in Tyler, although by all practical definitions, the amount of scientific
proof offered appears to have been roughly the same—at least in terms of the
total number of studies referenced.336 However, even assuming federal courts
decline to accept or even entertain a third type of temporal limitation, a
careful review of available, scientifically-rigorous longitudinal evidence
should conclude that the government’s purported fit is unreasonable, because
it cannot show there is a continued risk of violence presented by qualified
patients who have no history indicating other types of individual category
qualification possessing firearms.337 Indeed, it may be that the type of
temporal limitation is inconsequential, so long as the court is willing and able
to properly review the scientific context.
Put simply, the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Carter II, which was
later adopted fully by the Ninth Circuit in Wilson, was incorrect from
scientific, medical, and legal perspectives. There, the court made clear that it
saw little reason to address marijuana users specifically, instead choosing to
334. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) (2016); United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 125 (4th
Cir 2012); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2012).
335. See supra notes 41–46; see generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C § Appx.
(Westlaw through Chapter 108 of 2018 2d Ann. Sess.) (entitled “Humanitarian Medical Use
of Marijuana”); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.102(1) (West Supp. 2018); 21 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 21-28.6-2(1) (Supp. 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005 (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through 2018 c 6).
336. In Carter II, the Fourth Circuit reviewed six total assessments—four studies and
two government surveys—to determine that there is a “strong link between drug use and
violence.” United States v. Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 467–69 (4th Cir. 2014). In
Tyler, the Sixth Circuit consulted the same number but arrived at the opposite conclusion in
regard to individuals adjudicated as mentally-ill under similar circumstances to the plaintiff.
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sherriff’s Dep’t 837 F.3d 678, 694–97 (6th Cir. 2016).
337. See supra notes 267–70, 272, 329.
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lump all drug users together, stating that the court was not required to make
such a “particularized demonstration” on the matter.338 A close reading of the
opinion appears to show that the court went to such lengths to avoid any
particularized demonstration in order to avoid ruling in favor of the
defendant.339 However, if the purpose of the ruling is to ascertain the
constitutionality of the statute as applied to the individual and that person did
not use illegal drugs outside marijuana—like Carter340—comparisons to
studies purporting to show a link between drug use and violence that mix
numerous other drugs in with marijuana are circumstantial and should not be
applied to the individual in question.341
In Carter II, the court reviewed four studies and two government
surveys, five of which were offered by the government. Of those reviewed,
none claim to be longitudinal in nature and to show a causal link between
marijuana use and violence.342 Of the five pieces of evidence presented by
the government, two were annual reports of government survey data showing
statistics for crimes committed and drug use by those individuals amongst
prisoners and arrestees.343 While such aggregations are useful in some
respects, proving a causal link between marijuana use and violent behavior
is not one of them.344 The government also introduced three studies, which
338. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467.
339. The court argued that the Wei study’s conclusion, which failed to “identify a
statistically significant correlation” between marijuana use and violent behavior, was not
“particularly relevant” after citing the same study to argue the opposite point of its
conclusion in the same paragraph. In order to argue against the study, the court went so far
as to impugn its methodology and valuations because it used “hard drug use” as a risk factor
for violence and this “weakened the correlation,” all without noting that Carter was not a
user of “hard drugs” so the diminished correlation would have applied specifically to him.
Id. at 468 & n.15 (citing Evelyn H. Wei, Rolf Loeber, & Helene Raskin White, Teasing
Apart the Developmental Associations Between Alcohol and Marijuana Use and Violence,
20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 166, 179 (2004)).
340. Carter II, 750 F.3d 462.
341. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 694–98 (noting at least four separate instances where the court
deemed the government’s empirical evidence to be insufficient as it did not apply
specifically to the plaintiff or similarly-situated individuals).
342. The Oser study notes as much in its discussion where the authors state that the data
examined was correlational, not causational in nature and that “longitudinal data are ideal”
for such studies. Oser et al., supra note 271, at 1300.
343. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467 n.3, 468 n.9.
344. Lana Harrison & Joseph Gfroerer, The Intersection of Drug Use and Criminal
Behavior: Results from the Nat’l Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 38 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 422, 439–41 (1991). In fact, the Harrison and Gfroerer study has harsh
criticism for the types of government surveys cited positively by the Carter II court. In their
discussion, the authors chastise the method by which the National Household Survey on
Drug Abuse (“NHSDA”) gathers and reports data, stating flatly that bias, underreporting,
and under-coverage are all likely to be present in the numbers used by those studies due to
insufficient data collection measures. Subsequent reviews confirm that government surveys,
such as those by NHSDA, still contain numerous reporting and data collection issues more
than 20 years later, such as processing errors in tabulating survey data, inferential errors due
to “poor study design and execution,” and specification errors in what is being researched.
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the court relied upon heavily,345 even though two of them reach conclusions
that directly contradict the point for which they were offered and cited by the
Fourth Circuit and a third is wholly inapplicable.346 The final study, which
was offered by the defendant, was cited by the court in the same paragraph
both as evidence that marijuana use and violence “coincide” and, oddly
enough, as a cudgel against the study’s authors for failing to find any
correlation between marijuana and violence when controlling for risk factors
and not using relaxed standards of scientific rigor that Congress employs.347
Instead of reading these studies for their conclusions and ruling based upon
that information, it seems more likely that both the government and the court
cherry-picked data from tables or sections that backed their preferred
outcome and ignored the vast amounts of evidence contained in those same
studies that did not.
Contrary to the arguments of the courts in Carter II and Wilson,
longitudinal studies performed over more than 30 years have shown that
marijuana does not correspond to the psychopharmacological model of
violence and its use does not make individuals more violent.348 One recent
study, performed in 2016, found that marijuana causes decreased levels of
Timothy P. Johnson, Sources of Error in Substance Use Prevalence Surveys, INT’L
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH NOTICES 12 (2014).
345. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467 nn.2 & 5–6.
346. The Fourth Circuit cited the Harrison and Gfroerer study to show that individuals
who have used marijuana in combination with alcohol and/or cocaine are more likely to be
violent than those who only use alcohol. Id. at 467. The court’s primary hypothesis, taken
from a table showing outcomes, is rebutted in the results and discussion of the study,
however, where the authors state, “[t]here is no firm evidence of a causal relationship
between drug use and crime,” be it violent or otherwise. Harrison & Gfroerer, supra note
344, at 423. In citing to Oser, the Fourth Circuit appears to have taken a table from a study
out of context, again, as the authors’ discussion makes clear. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 467. The
Oser study, which the authors note was not longitudinal in nature, found that a link between
drug use and violence exists, but only for male stimulant users in rural populations—not
marijuana users—and still attributed much of the nexus between drug use and violence to
violent victimization and economic compulsion brought on by a host of outside factors. Oser
et al., supra note 271, at 1298–1301.
In citing the McCoy study, the Fourth Circuit states that it found cocaine and/or opiate
users—categorized as “Chronic Drug Users” by the authors—are more likely to be violent,
which is generally correct according to the findings of the study, but the court failed to note
that the study also found that individuals who “may have used marijuana or other drugs” but
were not Chronic Drug Users were not more likely to commit violent acts. Carter II, 750
F.3d at 467; H. Virginia McCoy, Sarah E. Messiah, & Zhinuan Yu, Perpetrators, Victims,
and Observers of Violence: Chronic and Non-Chronic Drug Users, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 890, 893–94, 903–907 (2001).
347. Carter II, 750 F.3d at 468 & nn.10, & 12–15.
348. See Wei, supra note 339, at 197; see also text accompanying supra note 338. See
generally Sharon M. Boles & Karen Miotto, Substance Abuse and Violence: A Review of the
Literature, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 155 (2003); R. Myerscough & S. Taylor, The
Effects of Marijuana on Human Physical Aggression, 49 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1541
(1985); Helene Raskin White, Rolf Loeber, Magda Stouthamer-Loeber & David P.
Farrington, Developmental Associations Between Substance Use and Violence, 11 DEV. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 785 (1999).
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aggression—lower than individuals ingesting alcohol and those given a
placebo who were sober—even when scientists attempted to agitate test
subjects.349 This is directly in line with other studies showing that marijuana
decreases aggressiveness levels, leading to decreased levels of violence. 350
Another study compared 20 substances—including marijuana, cocaine,
alcohol, and tobacco—and rated them from most to least harmful with scores
divided between harm to others and harm to self.351 Of the 20 cited, marijuana
was eighth, below both alcohol and cigarettes, meaning that it was not among
the most harmful either to self or others and no correlation with violence
could be shown.352 This is not to argue that individuals cannot have
psychological episodes while consuming marijuana,353 but is intended to
show that the analysis used by federal circuits is woefully inadequate and
must be revised. Simply put, there is scant evidence to show that marijuana
use causes violent behavior in greater instances than the general public and
without such evidence, the government cannot meet its burden under
intermediate scrutiny or the post-Heller two-step test.
Moving beyond Carter II and the Fourth Circuit’s review of
scientific studies and government surveys, there is ample evidence available
from other sources to support the contention that marijuana use does not
cause increased levels of violence. For instance, in Tyler, the majority relied
heavily on Congress’ decision to revise the relief-from-disabilities provision
of the Gun Control Act solely as it applied to individuals adjudicated as
mentally-ill, which the Sixth Circuit viewed as a legislative determination
indicating that Congress no longer considered such individuals to be more
violent.354 Utilizing this reasoning, most of the states that maintain
comprehensive medical marijuana programs, and laws forbidding possession
of firearms by users of illegal drugs, do not consider qualified patients to be
more violent as those individuals are exempted from such restrictions.355
Though not as persuasive as the congressional decision in Tyler, these states
have made their own legislative determinations indicating that they do not
consider qualified patients to be more violent than the general public.

349. E.B. de Sousa Fernandes Perna et al., Subjective Aggression During Alcohol &
Cannabis Intoxication Before & After Aggression Exposure, 233 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
3331, 3338–39 (2016).
350. See Myerscough & Taylor, supra note 348.
351. David J. Nutt, Leslie A. King & Lawrence D. Phillips, Drug Harms in the UK: A
Multicriteria Decision Analysis, 376 LANCET 1558 (2010).
352. Id. at 1558, 1561 & fig.2, 1563 & fig.4.
353. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 45, at 296 & box 12-1, 326
box 12-3.
354. See generally sources cited supra notes 248–51, 263.
355. Of the 27 states cited in Yancey, seventeen now have comprehensive medical
marijuana programs, two have not finalized their laws yet, and thirteen exempt qualified
patients from state firearms qualification laws. See supra text accompanying note 316; see
infra Appendix, Table 2; see generally United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir.
2010).
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Further, the common sense conclusions arrived at by the Ninth
Circuit in Wilson—arguing that qualified patients are even less prone to
violence than typical marijuana users because the means and avenues through
which marijuana has traditionally been purchased do not apply to them—are
useful to show that marijuana users and qualified patients are not more prone
to violence.356 The court stated that increased “negative interactions” with
police and frequent use of “black market sources who themselves frequently
resort to violence” were both factors indicating an increased penchant for
violence in marijuana users.357 The holding goes on to state that it is arguable
that “medical marijuana users are less likely to commit violent crimes, as
they often suffer from debilitating illnesses” and they are not required to
interact with police or the black market to obtain marijuana.358 At the time,
the court ignored this hypothesis because it could not overcome concerns
over “irrational or unpredictable behavior” from ingesting marijuana.359
However, such concerns have been invalidated by the longitudinal, scientific
evidence presented earlier in this Part, which shows that marijuana users are
not prone to such risky behavior, and may in fact be less likely to become
aggressive while using marijuana.360 Therefore, federal courts are free to
accept the Ninth Circuit’s common sense hypothesis as an indicator that
qualified patients are less likely to be prone to violence, a conclusion that
some studies have also reached.361 Finally, it must be noted that the DOJ and
ATF should be barred from undertaking this type of enforcement in states
with medical marijuana regimes due to the restrictions of the RohrabacherFarr Act.362
Without a link between marijuana and violence, the government
should not be able to meet the standards for either intermediate scrutiny or
356. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See De Sousa Fernandes Perna et al., supra note 349. Common sense would also
dictate that marijuana users are less prone to violence than the general public because
alcohol use is far more common than marijuana use and “alcohol is the drug with the
strongest association to violence.” See Oser et al., supra note 271, at 1287 (citations
omitted).
361. One study, which analyzed the effects that medical marijuana legalization had on
state crime by measuring the seven Part I Uniform Crime Reporting offenses from 19902006, found that legalization led to reductions in homicide and assault rates, while robbery
and burglary rates remained steady. Overall, the authors concluded that their “findings run
counter to arguments suggesting the legalization of marijuana for medical purpose poses a
danger to public health in terms of exposure to violent crime and property crimes.” Robert
G. Morris et al., The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on Crime: Evidence from State
Panel Data, 1990-2006, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 6–7 (2014). This reinforces other, more limited
studies that have shown that marijuana legalization does not increase crime in states or cities
where marijuana has been legalized recreationally. Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard, & Jeffrey
Miron, Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana Legalization, CATO INST., 799 POL’Y
ANALYSIS 1, 14–16 (Sept. 16, 2016).
362. See infra Part III, Section C.
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the post-Heller two-step test. Overwhelmingly, longitudinal, scientific
evidence shows that marijuana does not make its users more violent, and may
even lessen an individual’s aggressive tendencies below the threshold of
sober individuals. Further, legislative determinations by numerous states that
have legalized medical marijuana show that they do now view qualified
patients as more dangerous or prone to violence. Even common sense—
reinforced by studies of criminal activity rates—leads to the conclusion that
marijuana does not make individuals more violent.363 Although the
government can answer the first part of intermediate scrutiny analysis
successfully, it cannot show that an objective fit exists between qualification
of Second Amendment rights if it cannot prove that qualified patients are
more violent. For the government, failing intermediate scrutiny analysis also
means failing the second step of the post-Heller test, meaning that the
qualification is unconstitutional, at least as applied to qualified patients.
C. Preliminary Injunction: The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment Blocks
Gun Control Act and CSA Enforcement Against Qualified Patients
While Part II.B argues that federal law and precedent require that
federal courts revise their analysis of section 922(g)(3) for future cases
involving qualified patients, the federal government currently faces a much
direr threat to its marijuana enforcement strategies. Indeed, the RohrabacherFarr Amendment, so long as it remains in force, presents a foundational
impediment to any enforcement action undertaken using DOJ funds that
would prevent states from implementing or furthering their medical
marijuana laws or would seek to punish individuals or businesses that
attempted to take advantage of those laws. Such restrictions extend to all of
the DOJ’s subsidiary agencies,364 including the FBI, DEA, and the ATF and

363. Though a small number of marijuana users do experience contraindications from
ingestion, causing them symptoms outside those regularly expected, this is not uncommon of
medicine and studies have shown that individuals who have mental disorders or who are
predisposed to them may exhibit violence uncommon to typical marijuana ingestion.
However, such outliers do not invalidate longitudinal data showing that marijuana either has
no effect or lessens aggression and violence in most users and that qualified patients who do
not fall under any of the other individual category qualification requirements of the Gun
Control Act cannot be shown to be more violent than the general public. See Christopher
Ingraham, Researchers got people drunk or high, then made a fascinating discovery about
how we respond, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/FZA3-LZ2J; see also supra
text accompanying note 44; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED, supra note 45, at 289312. But see Sarah Young, Smoking Cannabis Increases Violent Behavior in Young People
with Mental Health Disorders, Study Finds, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XF45-BNUX.
364. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, (2018) https://perma.cc/7KN79JML; see also United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2016)
(applying the holding to both the DOJ and the DEA); Brief of Members of Congress
Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Farr (D-CA) as Amici in Support of Charles C. Lynch’s Motion for
Rehearing En Banc, at 15–16, United States v. Lynch (9th Cir. May 5, 2015) (Nos. 10-
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include any enforcement actions used by those agencies such as the DEA’s
administration of the CSA or the ATF’s application of the Gun Control Act.
Briefly, this subpart will address the problems inherent with the McIntosh
strict compliance requirement as well as the tangible ramifications of the
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment on DOJ enforcement policy.
Although the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment is still a valid defense
to many DOJ actions for many qualified patients, the strict compliance
standard leaves obvious avenues for the DOJ to operate that should have been
forbidden. Instead, the Ninth Circuit’s standard allows the DOJ and the
federal government to continually maintain the threat that Rohrabacher-Farr
was intended to quash, and one that the court has previously recognized as
an unconstitutional threat and overreach in Conant. By allowing a federal
agency to maintain the threat of arrest, prison time, and the forfeiture of rights
that accompanies federal marijuana charges, the strict compliance standard
fundamentally undermines the stated purpose and plain language of
Rohrabacher-Farr by exerting undue influence and attempting to again
criminalize conduct that a state has previously held to be legal.365 The
following illustrates the shortcomings with the strict compliance standard.
First, while the idea that qualified patients cannot strictly comply
with state or municipal medical marijuana laws may seem laughable, it is a
real and pressing concern in many states. Whereas medical marijuana laws
are seemingly commonplace and have been in place for years, many
outstanding legal questions have yet to be resolved, and many others are the
subject of inconclusive court rulings and state circuit splits. For example, one
outstanding legal question that has never been fully resolved in California
involves quantity possession limits.366 While the amount is codified in most
states, California law allows for “qualified patients, valid identification
cardholders, and their primary caregivers to pool their efforts and resources
to cultivate marijuana . . . in amounts necessary to meet the reasonable
medical needs of qualified patients and cardholders.”367 However, no test
exists to determine what constitutes a reasonable amount.368 In fact, due in
part to allowing municipalities to adopt and modify parts of the state law,
California’s laws are so scattered and contradictory at the municipal level
that a set of guidelines issued by the State’s Attorney General in 2008 was
50219, 10-50264 ) (quoting members of the House of Representatives who opposed the
amendment stating that subordinate agencies to the DOJ would also be affected).
365. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
366. See ProCon.org, 30 Legal Medical Marijuana States & DC: Laws, Fees, and
Possession Limits (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/4ABY-5C3T (noting that while some
states have defined ounce or plant limitations, other states have vague “30-day supply”
limits).
367. People v. London, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 392, 402 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
368. People v. Wright, 146 P.3d 531, 541–42 (Cal. 2006); see also People v. Kelly, 222
P.3d 186, 196–97, 213–14 (Cal. 2010) (finding that attempts to establish possession limits
via a new state law unconstitutionally abridged the state’s original medical marijuana law).

2018]

STICKY SITUATION

167

later deemed to be merely “persuasive” and therefore non-binding upon both
citizens and state courts.369 Another example comes in the form of restrictions
on dispensaries. Due to an oversight in drafting its legislation, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the state’s medical marijuana law did not allow for
dispensaries to be licensed by the state.370 Conversely, the state law allowed
but did not require municipalities to issue operating licenses until late 2017,
when new state licenses were approved legislatively. 371 Under either
example, any Michigan or California qualified patient exercising their rights
under state law in good faith could still be charged in federal court by the
DOJ and this enforcement action would be well-within the McIntosh strict
compliance standard, yet violating Rohrabacher-Farr.
Second, the strict compliance requirement further allows the DOJ to
commandeer state police functions and substitute its own decision-making
authority where state law enforcement has previously determined that an
individual was not breaking any state law. A brazen affront to the principals
of federalism, usually championed by conservatives, the DOJ has utilized this
tactic for many years, with Charles Lynch being the most notable example.
Lynch was deemed by state law enforcement to have been acting in
compliance with the law but was arrested by federal officers and later
prosecuted by the DOJ anyway.372 In such instances, the purpose of
Rohrabacher-Farr is directly frustrated, state efforts to enforce their own laws
are undermined by a meddling federal agency, and individuals who should
not be in court are subjected to expensive, pointless, and illegal hearings in
federal court.373 Further, the strict compliance standard largely violates
precedent in the Ninth Circuit, which has long required that state courts hear

369. People v. Hochandel, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see also
CAL. ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDELINE FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION
OF MARIJUANA GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE (2008).
370. See State v. McQueen, 828 N.W.2d 644, 650–57 (Mich. 2013) (holding that
although Michigan’s medical marijuana statutory definition of “medical use” of marijuana
does include its sale, the law does not provide for the establishment of dispensaries or
cultivation centers, or for transfers which would trigger immunity or affirmative defense
provisions).
371. Kathleen Gray, Michigan: Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Can Stay Open – For
Now, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://perma.cc/HNR4-9XGN. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.27101-27801 (2016) (amending Michigan’s medical marijuana
law to allow for dispensaries and other commercial facilities and transactions); Dep’t of
Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Medical Marijuana Facility Licensing (2018)
https://perma.cc/VL46-HXW6 (requiring implementation of new facilities licensing laws by
December 15, 2017).
372. Brief of Sen. Mark Leno (SD-11) et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Charles C.
Lynch’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc, at 13–15, United States v. Lynch, (9th Cir. May 7,
2015) (Nos. 10-50219 and 10-50264).
373. Prior to the creation of Rohrabacher-Farr, defenses predicated upon legal medical
marijuana use under state law were not accepted by federal courts. See, e.g. United States v.
Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the defendant was
precluded from asserting a medical marijuana defense).
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and determine the appropriateness of affirmative defenses predicated upon
state law and introduced by a defendant.374
Third, the McIntosh standard seemingly requires the DOJ to break
multiple federal laws in order to bring enforcement actions before federal
courts. Rohrabacher-Farr is unequivocal in its requirement that the DOJ not
use any federal funding to prevent state medical marijuana laws from being
implemented, yet the Ninth Circuit appears to have presented the DOJ with
an out. However, the Amendment contains no such exception, thus placing
the agency at odds with the law. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit failed to
address the Anti-Deficiency Act,375 which states that an employee of the
United States may not “make or authorize an expenditure or obligation
exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the
expenditure or obligation.”376 Though the Anti-Deficiency Act is typically
used in contract disputes, the language is quite clear and is not delimited to
those actions solely.377 Thus, by bringing an action that would chill medical
marijuana implementation in federal court using funds appropriated by
Congress, the DOJ is readily violating two federal laws: The RohrabacherFarr Amendment and the Anti-Deficiency Act.
In order to find that strict compliance is appropriate, the Ninth
Circuit first argued that it was required to read the word “laws” literally,
allowing it to find the narrowest interpretation and stating that it could not
take legislative intent into account due to Supreme Court precedent.378 In its
ruling, the court implied that the Supreme Court has long-forbidden federal
courts from using legislative intent when interpreting an imprecise
appropriations rider, but this conclusion appears to be a misreading of the
cited cases. In Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court utilized the Committee
Reports and legislative statements to elucidate the meaning and requirements
of a dense appropriation’s act on tribal funding.379 The language cited by the
Ninth Circuit, when read in the context of the opinion, holds that legislative
history is only forbidden if it is used to change the wording of an
appropriations rider authorized by Congress.380 In Lincoln, the Supreme
Court did not forbid the use of intent to glean the correct inference, but
374. Strauss v. United States, 376 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Perez v.
United States, 297 F.2d 12, 13–14 (5th Cir. 1961)).
375. Anti-Deficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 1341, 96 Stat. 923 (1982) (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2017)).
376. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2011).
377. For examples of how the Anti-Deficiency Act is traditionally applied, see
generally Davis & Assocs., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 501 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2007);
Union Pac. R.R. Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 730 (2002).
378. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005)); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182, 192 (1993) (citations omitted).
379. 543 U.S. at 639–41.
380. Id. at 644–46 (finding against the federal government, which argued that specific
provisions were invalid due to conflicting legislative history, though the final wording was
clear in the enacted language).
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instead forbid federal courts from taking legislative intent into account when
determining how funds should be spent.381 In fact, Lincoln makes a
distinction between “lump-sum appropriation[s],” like those described in the
case, and those like Rohrabacher-Farr that contain specific language
“statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds,” forbidding
legislative intent in interpreting the former while making no such restrictions
on the latter.382
Thus, if federal courts look to legislative intent to interpret
Rohrabacher-Farr, as the Supreme Court explicitly allowed and performed in
Cherokee Nation, it is quite clear that it was written to eliminate federal
“medical marijuana prosecutions and forfeiture actions immediately in states
that permit the use of medical marijuana.”383 Six of the amendment’s
sponsors argued during its debate that the rider was intended to halt all
federal prosecutions of individuals taking advantage of medical marijuana
laws.384 Indeed, the intent to stop the DOJ and its subsidiary agencies from
prosecuting medical marijuana offenses, regardless of compliance with state
law, was so well understood that opponents of the Amendment openly
campaigned against it on these terms. One Representative stated that it would
“make it difficult, if not impossible, for the DEA and [DOJ] to enforce the
law” while another complained that the DEA would be unable to enforce the
CSA and would be “prohibited from going into that person’s house growing
as many plants as they want.”385 In short, the members of Congress who
passed Rohrabacher-Farr were well aware of its scope and the intent of its
writers, even where individuals were outwardly and knowingly in violation
of medical marijuana laws, as that issue was to be resolved by the states
themselves, not the federal government.386
Regardless of whether the McIntosh standard is adopted by other
federal courts, disposed of altogether, or results in a circuit split,
Rohrabacher-Farr still presents a fundamental impediment to all DOJ
enforcement as described in this Article. Not only does it require the DOJ to
cease prosecution of any individual who is strictly compliant—in the Ninth
Circuit—or otherwise, it also requires all DEA agents attempting to enforce
the CSA in the enumerated states to cease those actions as well. This means
all actions described in Section I.B should have already ceased because all
funding for the DEA and its enforcement of the CSA comes directly from the
381. 508 U.S. at 192–93.
382. Id. at 192.
383. See Brief of Members of Congress Rohrabacher (R-CA) and Farr (D-CA) as Amici
in Support of Charles C. Lynch’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 363, at 11.
384. Id. at 11–15.
385. Id. at 15–16 (statements of Reps. Fleming and Harris, respectively, both of whom
opposed the Amendment); see supra note 364.
386. See generally Kris Hermes, Feds Back off Medical Marijuana Enforcement in 32
States and DC, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS (Dec. 29, 2014) https://perma.cc/U3EDQ5KX; Allayne Sherer, First major victory in the fight to end federal interference,
AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS (May 31, 2014) https://perma.cc/3Z52-EA8N.
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DOJ. Likewise, all ATF action to administer section 922(g)(3) of the Gun
Control Act in those enumerated states should have ceased, including all
requirements listed in the ATF Open Letter due to the ATF being a
subordinate agency to the DOJ and receiving all its funding from them.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to be the first to describe the constitutional
violations being visited upon and threatened against qualified patients acting
legally under state law by the federal government. When federal courts apply
the Gun Control Act to qualified patients and deprive them of their right to
bear arms, they are utilizing bad or misunderstood data and further
misapplying precedent to do so. By analyzing this issue through a generalized
framework looking at medical marijuana law and policy at both the state and
federal levels as well as Second Amendment jurisprudence and the
application of the former to the latter, this Article intends to serve as both an
introduction to the subject and a guide for future discourse.
It should also be noted that this Article does not seek the proliferation
of additional firearms into a country already rife with violence and mass
casualty incidents caused by them. Instead, the Article seeks to shed light on
the constitutional violations that are occurring and call for equal treatment
under federal and state law.
While it may seem a laughable excuse to some, medical marijuana
helps many Americans cope with pain, anxiety, death and the many side
effects attendant to debilitating illnesses. Stigmatizing and punishing
qualified patients is an unnecessary and unconstitutional overreach based on
illegitimate science and the federal government’s prohibitionist attitude
toward marijuana, and seemingly, little more.
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APPENDIX

Table I: List of Comprehensive Medical Marijuana
Programs by State with Federal Circuit Court387
State
California
Washington
Oregon
Alaska
Maine
Colorado
Nevada
Hawaii
Vermont
Montana
Rhode Island
New Mexico
Michigan
New Jersey
Arizona
D.C. 388
Delaware
Connecticut
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Illinois

Year
Program
Adopted*
1996
1998
1998
1998
1999
2000
2000
2000
2004
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2010
2011
2012
2012
2013
2013

Federal
Circuit
Ninth
Ninth
Ninth
Ninth
First
Tenth
Ninth
Ninth
Second
Ninth
First
Tenth
Eighth
Third
Ninth
D.C.
Third
Second
First
First
Seventh

387. Information in Table 1 was compiled from the following sources: State Medical
Marijuana Laws, Table 1, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (June 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/T75F-KZYG; see also ProCon.org, 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States &
DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, June 26, 2017, https://perma.cc/Q9YF-FXRS;
MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 33.
388. In 1998, Washington, D.C. voters passed Initiative 59 with 69% voting in favor,
but it was blocked congressionally via a spending measure, which was subsequently lifted in
December 2009, allowing the District’s city council to vote to allow medical marijuana.
Ashley Southall, Washington, D.C. Approves Medical Use of Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (May
4, 2010), https://perma.cc/QW3C-URB9.
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New York
Minnesota
Guam
Maryland
Puerto Rico
Ohio389
Pennsylvania
North Dakota390
Arkansas
Florida
Louisiana391
West Virginia392

2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2017

[Vol. 6:1: 115
Second
Eighth
Ninth
Fourth
First
Sixth
Third
Eighth
Eighth
Eleventh
Fifth
Fourth

* Year program was fully adopted by state either via popular vote
or legislative act

389. Ohio’s medical marijuana program is currently being implemented and is
scheduled to become operational in September 2018. Timeline & Rules, OHIO MED.
MARIJUANA CONTROL PROGRAM, https://perma.cc/45FE-QC7K.
390. North Dakota’s medical marijuana program is currently being implemented and is
scheduled to open to the public sometime in 2018. John Hageman, North Dakota Health
Dep’t Begins Implementing New Medical Marijuana Law, BISMARCK TIMES (May 2, 2017)
https://perma.cc/5ZLQ-636N.
391. Prior to 1996, Louisiana was the only state with a medical marijuana law,
however, it was symbolic and ineffective. Passed in 1978, the law allowed physicians to
prescribe marijuana for medicinal purposes. James McClure, The First State to Legalize
Medical Marijuana Is Finally About to Get it Right, CIVILIZED (May 17, 2016),
https://perma.cc/Y699-JZ39. Recently however, state officials worked to amend the statute,
resulting in Louisiana’s adoption of comprehensive medical marijuana program, available in
2018. Melinda Deslatte, Louisiana Medical Marijuana Bill Signed, CANNABIST (May 20,
2016) https://perma.cc/87V3-E8EC.
392. West Virginia’s implementation period is the longest of all recent adoptees with
registration not expected to begin until July 1, 2019. Bureau for Pub. Health, West Virginia
Medical Cannabis Program, W. VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., (Apr. 20, 2017).
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Table II: List of States with Laws Qualifying Gun Possession by Illegal Drug Users and Comprehensive
Medical Marijuana Programs and Application to Qualified Patients
State
California
Colorado
Nevada

Statute Qualifying Gun
Possession by Drug
User
CAL.
PENAL
CODE
§ 12021(a)(1)
(2011)
(repealed 2012)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1812-203(1)(f)

Rhode Island

11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 47-6
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58New Jersey
3(c)(2)
D.C.
CODE
§ 22D.C.
4503(a)(4)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
Delaware
§ 1448(a)(3) (2017)
MASS. GEN. LAWS CH.
Massachusetts
140 § 129B(1)(iii)
New Hampshire

Language Enforcing
Qualification

People v. Leal, 210 Cal.
App. 4th 829, 842 (1st Dist.
App. 2012)393
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII
§ 14(2)(a)394
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 202.257(1)(b);
§ 202.360(1)(d)
453A.300395
Paul Perrone, Firearm
Registrations in Hawaii,
2016, Department of the
Attorney General, at 7-8
& tbl.3396

HAW. REV. STAT. § 1347(c)(1)

Hawaii

Illinois

Language Exempting
Qualified Patients

21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28.6-4
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I6(b)
D.C.
CODE
1671.03(e)397
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 4903A(a)
MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 94C
§§ 4; 6(A)

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 159:3(I)(b)(3)
§ 126-X:2(i)
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ANN. 5/24-3.1(a)(3)
130/25(a)

393. See generally 210 Cal. App. 4th 829, 842 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
394. See Hutchins, supra note 87.
395. When read together, Nevada law states that firearm possession is illegal for a
qualified patient only when the individual is both under the influence of marijuana and
maintains actual physical possession of the firearm simultaneously, not solely for ownership.
396. According to Hawaii’s Attorney General, current qualified patients will be denied
firearms permits by the State but may successfully obtain a permit “one year after the
expiration” of registration card.
397. See Klieger et al., supra note 32; see generally D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08(c), (d)
(2017).
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